Legal and constitutional phases of the WRA program. by United States. War Relocation Authority. et al.


Legal and Constitutional Phases 
of the WRA Program 
United States Department of the Interior 
J. A. KRUG, Secretary 
War Relocation Authority 
D. s. MYER, Director 
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents 
U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25. D. C. 
P r i c e  30 cents 

PART- 
....... I . WE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EVACUATION AND DETENTION 3 
Was Evacuation Constitutional? ....................... 4 
Was Detention Constitutional? ........................ 9 
Detention Pending the Sorting ..................... ll 
Detention fo r  Employment and Commnity Acceptance . 12 
..... Detention of  Those Deemed Inel igible  to Leave 14 
How Long was Continued Exclusion Constitutional? ..... 15 'Ihe Strategy fo r  Litigation .......................... 16 
11 . LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS I N  lHE DEVELOPMENT  OF CENlER 
MANAGEMENT POLICIES ..................................... 18 
'Ihe Geneva Convention ................................ 18 
State  and Federal Jurisdiction ....................... 20 
................................. Conmnmity Government 24 
....... 'Ihe Power t o  Establish Cormrmnity Government 24 
Police Regulations ................................ 26 
hracuee Participation in Center Oovernment . 29 
..... Extra-oFdinary Law and Order Measures 33 
............... Prlvate Business a t  the Centers 34 
... III . STRUCRIRE AND FUNCTIONS OF 'ME ~AIUL' LEOAL ORGANIZATION 37 
.......................................... Organimtion 37 
.................... 'be Work of the Washington Office 38 
....... Constitutional Issues and the Leave Program 38 
Field Operations .................................. 38 
................. Assistance t o  Center Cooperatives 40 
.......................... Problems of the Evacuees 40 
.............. Participation i n  Program Development 41 
Miscellaneous ..................................... 43 
.................. Supervision over Field Attorneys 44 
Recruitsnent ....................................... 45 
.......................................... Training 46 
The Work of the Regional Attorneys ................... 48 
................. The Work of the San Francisco Office 49 
........... Assistance t o  Evacuee Property Division 49 
Assistance t o  Project Attorneys ................... 50 
...................... !be Attorney Referral System 50 
. Alien Land Laws ................................... 52 
Other Problems .................................... 52 
............................... Special Assignments 53 
.................... The Work of the Project Attorneys 53 
Staff Senrlces .................................... 54 
.............................. Cornunity Government 55 
............................... Private Enterprises 55 
Assistance t o  Evacuees ............................ 56 
....................... ?he Work o f  the Area Attorneys 57 
Housing .......................................... 57 
Discrindnation .................................... 58 
Miscellaneous ..................................... 58 
LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL PHASES OF 
THE WRA PROGRAM 
- 
INTRODUCTION 
Probably no Federal ac t iv i ty  has provided a greater variety of 
legal  content or more stimulus and challenge to i ts  lawyers than has 
the program of the War Relocation Authority. The wartime involuntary 
evacuation from t he i r  homes of over 100,000 persons of a minority 
group, c i t izens as well as aliens,  was without h is tor ica l  precedent. 
The decision t o  impose limited detention upon the evacuees i n  the re- 
location centers pending loyalty screening and assurance of acceptance 
i n  outside communities, based though it was on pract ical  exigencies, 
ra ised additional constitutional issues that were only par t ia l ly  re- 
solved by the United States  Supreme Court before the end of the program. 
Wartime emotions, abetted by the ac t iv i t i e s  of h is tor ica l ly  anti- 
Japanese forces on the West Coast, resulted i n  numerous expressions of 
legis lat ive and administrative discrimination against the evacuees tha t  
ra ised other issues vitally important t o  the future of c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s  
in t h i s  country. 
The creation of self-contained communities for  the housing and 
maintenance of the evacuees, likewise without analogous precedent, 
necessitated the establishment of a pattern f o r  government and the 
improvisation of community inst i tut ions,  within defined concepts of 
State  and Federal jurisdiction, t h a t  could function effectively and 
as dmocrat ical ly  a s  circumstances would permit. The legal  problems 
of the evacuees themselves ran the whole gamut of a general l a w  p r a c -  
tice; i n  a very real sense the WRA l ega l  organization was also a l a w  
firm fo r  10 communities comprising over 100,000 persons. 
Part  I of t h i s  report  analyzes the basic  constitutional issues in- 
volved i n  the evacuation and in the Authority's subsequent leave pro- 
gram, and outlines the position taken w i t h  respect t o  l i t i ga t ion  
Note: Part  I of this report  was prepared by Philip M. Glick, Assistant 
Director  of WRA and former Solicitor; Parts II and III were prepared by 
Edwin E. Ferguson, Solicitor.  
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strategy. Par t  I I is a discussion of the legal frame of reference 
w i t h i n  which the basic policies f o r  center administration were for- 
mulated. Part  III summarizes the organization of the Office of the 
Sol ici tor  and the work performed in  Washington and a t  each level of 
operations in  the field. Attention i s  called particularly t o  the 
policies established for supervision over the work of field attorneys 
and f o r  attorney training, and t o  the system developed fo r  r e fe r ra l  of 
cases t o  private attorneys where necessary.  
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PART I 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EVACUATION AND DETENTION 
The evacuation of 12,000 persons of Japanese ancestry, t he i r  con- 
tinued exclusion from the West Coast from the summer of 1 9 4 2  u n t i l  
January of 1945, and the i r  detention for  varying periods of time in 
assembly centers and relocation centers, inevitably raised extremely 
grave questions a s  t o  the  consistency of such a program w i t h  the  re- 
quirements and the prohibitions of the Federal Constitution. The f a c t  
t h a t  two-thirds of the evacuees were c i t izens  of the United States  by 
b i r t h  sharpened these very grave issues. 
Did the Federal Government  have consti tutional power to evacuate 
a l l  these people from their homes and the i r  jobs, and compel them t o  
leave the West  Coast? Even the women and children? Even those who were 
ci t izens? Could it do so without charging any of them with having com- 
mitted any crime, and without any t r i a l  or hearing? Could the Govern- 
ment f o l l o w  the  order t o  vacate the West Coast with enforced detention 
i n  an assembly center? Could the Gavernment thereafter, without con- 
su l t ing  the evacuees, transport these people from the assembly centers 
t o  relocation centers under mil i tary guard and thereafter incarcerate 
and forcibly detain the evacuees in the relocation centers? What about 
the constitutional  r ights ,  in particular,  of those evacuees who ware 
c i t izens  of the United States  and who ins i s ted  throughout these activi-  
t i e s  t h a t  they were pa t r io t ic ,  and loyal to the United States, and 
will ing t o  f i g h t  in the armies of the United States t o  prove tha t  
loyalty? 
Not all the of f icers  and agents of the United States  Govement 
who played responsible par t s  i n  the evacuation and detention were 
seriously troubled by these questions of consti tutional power and con- 
s t i t u t iona l  right. M a n y ,  however, were deeply concerned. It is the 
answers t o  these questions provided by those who were concerned-and, 
l a t e r ,  by the Supreme Court of the United States-that this report  
w i l l  discuss. 
There were two important reasons why the administrators of the 
WRA program f e l t  compelled to think through these searching questions 
of consti tutional authority. In the f i r s t  place, the evacuees were 
deeply shocked by the f a c t  of evacuation, and unable to determine what 
implications the evacuation carried f o r  t he i r  future  residence in the 
Unlted States  as  c i t izens or a s  lawfully resident aliens. WRA had t o  
provide to the evacuees and to i t s e l f  answers t o  these questions t h a t  
would provide a ra t iona l  and moral basis  fo r  its relocation program. 
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In the second place, W R A  had to be prepared to answer these same ques- 
t ions  when propounded by Congressional investigating c o m m i t t e e s ,  by 
groups attacking the relocation program, by ci t izens  whose support it 
sought t o  mobilize, and by l i t i g a n t s  i n  the courts. 
The many consti tutional issues  can be reduced to three basic 
questions: 
1. Was the evacuation valid under the Constitution? 
2. Was detention i n  assembly centers and relocation centers 
valid under the Constitution? 
3. If it were t o  be assumed tha t  the original  evacuation was 
consti tutional,  because it was compelled by an overriding mil i tary 
necessity, h o w  long did the mil i tary necessity continue t o  be suffi-  
c ien t ly  grave t o  jus t i fy  continued exclusion; did such continued exclu- 
sion remain va l id  a l l  the way through u n t i l  December 1944  when the 
exclusion orders were f i na l ly  revoked? 
Was Evacuation Constitutional? 
It is radical ly  important to make a dist inction a t  the outset  be- 
tween the question whether a given governmental acti'on was val id  under 
the Constitution and the question whether t ha t  action was wise o r  
proper. A governmental action-an increase in t a r i f f  schedules, the 
establishment of price control or consumer rationing, the prohibition 
of gambling, the evacuation of a l l  persons of Japanese ancestry from 
the West Coast, or  whatever-may be both a wise policy and a constitu- 
t iona l  policy, or it m a y  be a wise policy but not one permitted under 
our Constitution, or  it m a y  be an unwise policy but one tha t  i s  per- 
mitted under our Constitution, or it may be a policy tha t  is both un- 
wise and prohibited by our Constitution. This would seem t o  be an 
e l emen ta ry  idea,  hardly worth emphasizing, but for the f a c t  that ,  again 
and again, persons  convinced tha t  the  mass evacuation was unwise, un- 
sound, and unfair, leaped unthinkingly t o  the conclusion t h a t  a policy 
of which they so strongly disapproved as unwise must necessarily, 
therefore, be a lso unconstitutional. 
The reasoning which led  the Department of Justice and the Office 
of t he  Sol ic i tor  of WRA t o  the conclusion tha t  the evacuation was  
within the const i tut ional  power of the Federal Government and which 
was l a t e r  adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court of the United 
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- 
1 - States--may be summarized in the following numbered propositions: 2 
1. The question to be answered is: Was the mass evacuation within 
the power  of the Federal Goverment i n  the  spring of 1942, when it  was 
decided upon and put i n  effect?  It i s  the s i tuat ion i n  existence a t  
t ha t  time that  i s  controlling. (A l a te r  change i n  the s i tuat ion might 
require some new governmental ac t ,  but would not  a f fec t  the va l id i ty  of 
the e a r l i e r  evacuation.) 
2. The Federal Constitution confers upon the Federal Government 
the power  to wage war. This is an extremely broad power. It i s  "the 
power to wage war s u c c e s s f u l l y . "   It includes the power  t o  interfere  
very greatly with the l i ves  and f ree  movement of ci t izens  and al ien 
residents where the interference is a necessary s tep i n  waging war. 
3. I n  the present case the President authorized the evacuation 
by Executive order.3 Subsequently the Congress " ra t i f ied  and confirmed" 
t ha t  Executive order by enacting a s t a tu t e  which provided criminal 
penalt ies for  v i l o a t i o n of mil i tary orders issued pursuant t o  the 
Executive order.4 The evacuation was authorized, therefore, by the 
President  and the Congress acting together. It i s  not  necessary f o r  the 
Court to  determine whether the evacuation would have been val id  i f  
ordered by the President, solely under h i s  powers  a s  President, without 
Congressional concurrence. 
4. The crux of the issue is: Can the Government show tha t  the 
mass evacuation was a military necessity - that is, tha t  the evacuation 
was a necessary step i n  the of waging the w a r  against the 
enemy? That the evacuation was  such a m i l i t a r y  necessity w i l l  be demon- 
s t ra ted  immediately below--but f i r s t ,  we must introduce in to  the argu- 
ment a t  t h i s  point an important consideration: in determining whether 
1 
Korematsu v. United States,  323 U.S. 214, (1944 ) .  See a l so  Hirabayashi 
v. United States,  320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
2 
The argument is elaborated i n  the "Brief for  the United States"  f i l e d  
by the Government in the Supreme Court of the United States  i n  Koremat- 
su v. United States, O c t o b e r  Term 1 9 4 4 ,  No. 22.  See also the  "Brief 
for  the  United States" f i l e d  by the Government i n  the Supreme Court of 
the United States  i n  H i r a b a y a s h i  v. United States, 0ctober Term 1942, 
No. 870. 
3 
Executive Order  No. 9102, March 18, 1942. 
4 56 stat .  173, 18 U.S.C.A. 97b.  
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the evacuation was in f a c t  a mil i tary necessity, the C o u r t  will not 
subst i tute  i t s  own f i n a l  judgment on the f a c t s  for  the judgment made by 
the responsible mili tary commander who carried authority and responsi- 
b i l i t y  for  making the decision a t  the par t icular  time and i n  the parti-  
cular  circumstances. The Court w i l l  decide, not whether the judges 
would have ordered the evacuation i f  they had been the responsible m i l i -  
tary commanders a t  that time and had had available t o  them the f a c t s  
tha t  were available t o  the actual mili tary commander, but only whether 
the f a c t s  available t o  the military commander were such tha t  he could, 
i n  an honest and reasonable exercise of judgement, conclude t h a t  the 
evacuation was a mil i tary necessity. 
5. The f a c t s  available t o  the  responsible mi l i ta ry  commander i n  
the spring a n d  summer of 1942, which were suff ic ient  t o  enable him t o  
conclude, reasonably and honestly, t h a t  mass evacuation was a m i l i t a r y  
necessity  were  the  f o l l o w i n g :  
A. The mil i tary s i tuat ion on the West  Coast in the spring and 
summer of 1942 was grave.  The Japanese had successfully attacked the 
United States  Naval Base at  Pearl Harbor and had very seriously damaged 
the United S ta tes  Fleet. Rapidly thereafter the Japanese army invaded 
Thailand, sank the Bri t ish batt leships Wales  and Repulse captured 
7Guam, Wake Island, Hong Kong, Manila, Singapore, t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  East 
Indies, Rangoon, Burma, and t h e n  the whole of the Philippines. On 
February 27 the Battle of the Java Sea resulted in a naval defeat t o  
the United Nations. On June 3 Dutch Harbor, Alaska, was attacked by 
Japanese carrier-based aircraft, and on June 7 the  Japanese gained a 
foothold on Attu and Kiska Islands. Once Fn February and once in June 
1942 the coasts of California and Oregon, respectively, had been 
shelled. Following the Pearl Harbor attack the Japanese had a naval 
superiority of three or four to one in the Pacific Ocean. The A r m y  and 
the Navy believed t h a t  it was of the utmost mil i tary importance to pre- 
pare against an invasion of the Pacific Coast by Japan. 
B. The threa t  of invasion and attack of the Pacific Coast by 
Japan created f e a r  t h a t  the enemy might use the so-called f i f t h  column 
technique of warfare. 
C. VIar f a c i l i t i e s  and ins ta l la t ions  were concentrated on the West 
Coast t o  such an extent a s  to make it an area of special  mi l i ta ry  con- 
cern. Important Amy and Navy bases and a large proportion of the  
Nation's v i t a l  w a r  production f a c i l i t i e s  were located i n  t h a t  region. 
D. Approximately 112,000 persons of Japanese descent resided i n  
California, Washington, and Oregon a t  the time. There was considerable 
prejudice and h o s t i l i t y  toward these resident persons of Japanese des- 
cent, both c i t i zen  and alien,  on the pa r t  of the r e s t  of the popula- 
t ion,  expressed in discriminatory State  legis la t ion,  discrimination in 
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employment, severely limited social  intercourse, and considerable 
physical sepegation. 
E. About one-third of the persons  of Japanese ancestry were 
aliens,  because barred by the Federal naturalization laws from becoming 
citizens. 
F. It was widely believed tha t  the resident persons of Japanese 
ancestry f e l t  close t i e s  of kinship and sympathy with Japan. T h i s  be- 
l i e f  was in pa r t  based upon the maintenance of Japanese language schools, 
the existence of many Japanese cul tural  societies, the practice of 
Japanese parents of sending the i r  American-born children in the i r  early 
years t o  Japan for  some years of residence and education, so tha t  ap- 
proximately 10,000 Kibei were then l iving on the West Coast, the belief 
i n  and practice of Shintoism by an u n k n o w n  number of the group, and the 
f a c t  that m a n y  of the  parents had taken affirmative steps t o  secure or 
protect dual nationality in both the United States and Japan far their  
children. 
G. It was widely believed that there existed among the persons of 
Japanese ancestry on the West Coast an unknown number of potential  sabo- 
teurs, who could not be identified,  but would r i s e  t o  aid an invading 
Japanese Army, i f  such an invasion took place. 
H. It was generally feared on the  West Coast t ha t  the l a t e n t  
hos t i l i t y  t oward  persons of Japanese ancestry might produce c i v i l  dis- 
order and loca l  violence. 
6. A responsible mil i tary commander must guard against p r o b a b l e  
dangers and possible dangers, and not alone against dangers certain  to 
develop, t o  the extent tha t  h i s  available forces permit. 
7. Mass evacuation of a l l  persons of Japanese ancestry  would eli-  
minate the danger of the i r  engaging i n  sabotage and espionage in aid of 
invasion by the  Japanese Army and Navy, at  the price of compelling 
112,000 people t o  remain away from their  homes during the period of 
invasion, without  seriously disrupting w a r  production in the evacuated 
area. 
Considering these propositions cumulatively the Government took 
the position t h a t  the responsible mili tary commander could reasonably 
and honestly have decided, in the spring and summer of 1942, that  such 
mass evacuation was a m i l i t a r y  necessity. A majority of the Supreme 
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evacuation i n  i t s  decision i n  the Korematsu case. 5 
A thoughtful person considering the argument thus far presented 
w i l l  s t i l l  entertain some unanswered questions. In  the f i r s t  place, was 
th i s  not an evacuation of an en t i r e  r ac i a l  group because of the i r  r a c i a l  
difference, and if so, h o w  can it be consti tutional for  the Government 
t o  sanction race prejudice and race hate with a mass evacuation? The 
Government admitted in i t s  b r ie fs  in the Supreme Court that  unless the 
f a c t  of r a c i a l  difference could be shown t o  have a special e f f ec t  on the 
mil i tary problem, the evacuation of a r a c i a l  minority merely because of 
t h a t  r a c i a l  difference would violate  the consti tutional r igh ts  of the 
evacuees. The argument summarized above, however, indicates t h a t  the 
persons of Japanese ancestry were involved in a t o t a l  complex of circum- 
stances tha t  created a danger of sabotage and espionage i n  a id  of an in- 
vading Japanese Army. It was, therefore, mili tary necessity, and not 
the r ac i a l  difference, that created the consti tutional power t o  evacu- 
ate. 
This leads t o  another question: Why was there no mass evacuation 
from Hawaii where persons of Japanese ancestry bulked so much larger 
in the t o t a l  population, and does not the  fa i lu re  to evacuate from 
Hawaii cas t  doubt on the argument of mil i tary necessity? A suff ic ient  
answer may l i e  i n  the f ac t  t h a t  the whole of Hawaii was placed under 
mart ia l  law. The Army had thus gone far ther  i n  H a w a i i  t o  guard against 
sabotage and espionage than it was prepared to go on the West Coast of 
the Mainland, and the declaration of m a r t i a l  l a w  may well have made the 
expedient of evacuation of par t  of the population unnecessary. Further, 
a commanding general must consider the price he w i l l  have to pay for 
each protective measure he may wish t o  undertake. The price i n  reduced 
w a r  production on the West Coast of the United States would be small; 
t ha t  price in Hawaii would be disproportionately large. The danger may 
therefore wel l  have been considered suff ic ient  t o  jus t i fy  the decision 
5 
Korematsu v. United States,  323 U. S. 214 (1944). See also the unani- 
mous opinion of the Supreme Court i n  the case sustaining the constitu- 
t i ona l i t y  of the curfew regulations applicable to persons of Japanese 
ancestry, Hirabayashi v. United States, 3320 U.S. 81 (1943).  Mr.
Justice  Roberts dissented from the Court's decision i n  the Korematsu 
case on the ground tha t  the detention i n  assembly centers and relocation 
centers,  which i s  discussed below, was an inseparable par t  of the  t o t a l  
evacuation program, t h a t  such detention was unconstitutional, and tha t  
therefore the evacuation i t s e l f  was unconstitutional, the program as  a 
whole being ta inted with the inval idi ty  of detention. Mr. Jus t ice  
Murphy dissented on the ground t h a t  h i s  independent re-examination of 
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t o  evacuate on the West Coast while relying on the defenses of mart ia l  
l a w  i n  Hawaii. 
Why, then, were not Germans and I t a l i a n s  evacuated from the Pacific 
Coast--or from the East Coast a s  well? Here, again, the commanding  
general needs always to consider the  balance of forces and factors. It 
was the Japanese Army, and not the German or I ta l ian ,  t ha t  threatened 
invasion of the West  Coast. No army was considered a t  any time during 
the w a r  seriously t o  threaten an invasion of the East Coast. The size 
of t he  population t o  be evacuated, if Germans and I t a l i ans  were t o  be 
evacuated would, also, make the protective measure more cost ly  and 
hazardous than the anticipated danger. 
These are  the considerations which the Government and the  Court 
needed,to weigh when considering the const i tut ional i ty  of evacuation. 
Every c i t i zen  must likewise weigh them. Where unwise governmental ac- 
t ion  i s  advocated, it i s  i m p o r t a n t  t ha t  it be challenged and defeated, 
or repudiated if already performed, on the ground tha t  it i s  unwise, 
and through regular democratic processes. To condemn an unwise action 
by denying i t s  const i tut ional i ty  i s  to run the r i s k  of weakening the 
National Government so tha t  it may become incapable of taking similar 
action under circumstances where everyone may agree it has become wise. 
This, of course, is not t o  say t h a t  a l l those who advocated the 
mass evacuation were animated by considerations of mil i tary necessity. 
Many advocated it because they were blinded by race hate and many for 
petty,  se l f i sh  reasons. Also, many were easier  t o  convince of the m i l i -  
t a ry  necessity because r a c i a l  prejudice had prepared the i r  minds t o  
believe the worst. Part  of the  price of prejudice which a democracy 
must always pay i s  the power of prejudice to blind the democracy t o  
what the f a c t s  of necessity may be and t o  the courses of action tha t  
may be open toit. 
These, a t  any ra te ,  were the arguments that l e d  WRA, and the 
Federal Government a s    a  whole, t o  asser t  the  const i tut ional i ty  of eva- 
cuation. This posit ion makes i r re levant  the  f a c t  tha t  none of the 
evacuees were charged  with crime or  were given t r i a l s  or  hearings. 
The ground of evacuation was not  individual g u i l t  but the  necessity f o r  
mass evacuation to  guard against potent ia l  danger from a possible 
minority, the members of which could not be readi ly  identified. 
Was Detention Constitutional? 
The leave regulations and the relocation program of WRA have been
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described i n  d e t a i l  in other f inal  reports of the Authority and need not 
be restated here. 
In baldest outline, th i s  was the procedure: All the evacuees were 
detained, f i r s t  i n  assembly centers and then in  relocation centers, un- 
til certain basic infomation could be secured concerning them, and 
checked against the f i l e s  of the intelligence agencies of the Govern- 
ment, so that a judgment could be made as to each adult evacuee that he 
was or was not potentially dangerous to the internal security of the 
coun t ry  i f  released during the war .  (In practice, however, many were 
released for seasonal agricultural labor even before checking of their 
records was completed.) Those evacuees who were found, on the basis of 
this  screening, to be nnondangerous" were then eligible t o  leave the 
centers as soon as WRA was satisfied that they had a jpb or other means 
of support, and that the community into which they wished to go could 
receive them without danger of violence. (In fact, WRA also required 
each departing evacuee t o  agree t o  keep it notified of each change of 
address, but no evacuee was ever detained fo r  refusal to make th i s  
agreement and no action was ever taken against, the many who ignored the 
agreement. This was understood tacit ly t o  be a requirement born of ad- 
ministrative convenience and not of internal security, and was never 
intended to qualify the right t o  leave a center.) Those denied leave 
clearance were t o  r e m a i n  in detention. 
Whether this kind of detention was valid i n  the case of the alien 
evacuees is a question that can be answered  easily and may therefore be 
,disposed of It is  quite clear that Congress has conferred upon 
the P r e s i d e n t  7   the power to restrain and detain alien enemies i n  time 
of w a r  in such manner as he may think-necessary. The constitutionality 
of that  authorization i s  universally conceded. 
In  the case of the citizens, however, th is  detention program raises 
t h r e e  dist inct  questions: 
1. Did the Government have constitutional power t o  detain a l l  the 
evacuees while they were being sorted t o  determine which might be dan- 
gerous to internal security if released? 
2. Did the Goverment have constitutional power to  detain admit- 
tedly nondangerous evacuees unt i l  the Authority was satisfied that  they 
had a means of support and that the community into w h i c h  they wished to  
go could receive them without danger of violence? 
6 See "WRA - A Story of Human Conservation","'The Relocation Program",  
and "Wartime  Exile".  
7 50 U.S.C. 21 - 24                               (10)  
3.  Could the Goverrnnent constitutionally detain those evacuees 
deemed potentially dangerous, and for how  long? 
Detention Pending the Sorting 
If the evacuation were to be considered t o  be unconstitutional 
then, of course, any variety of postevacuation detention also falls as 
without constitutional support. Assume, however, that  the evacuation 
i t se l f  be deemed constitutional, could not the Government have said t o  
the evacuees as  they  stood on the eastern border of the evacuated area, 
"Go wherever you wish in the United States, but you may not return to 
the excluded area unt i l  further word"? 
It i s  diff icult ,  in the calm aftermath of a securely-won war, t o  
recal l  the worried concern, the heightened sense of danger, the vola- 
t i l e  emotional atmosphere that were the inescapable facts  of l i f e  dur- 
ing the months when the enemy was i n  the ascendancy and the Nation was 
grimly getting ready to  launch a hoped-for offensive .Detention was a 
policy which the responsible officers of WRA decided upon reluctantly, 
out of a conviction that no other course was administratively feasible 
or genuinely open t o  them. The agitation for mass evacuation had re- 
peatedly asserted that  West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry were 
of uncertain loyalty. The Government's la ter  decision t o  evacuate was 
widely interpreted as  proof of the truth of that assertion. Hence, a 
widespread demand sprang up immediately after  the evacuation that the 
evacuees be kept under guard, or a t  the very least,  that they be sorted 
and that  the dangerous ones among them be watched and kept from doing 
harm. In these circumstances it was almost inescapable that the pro- 
gram adminis t ra tors  should come to the conclusion that i f  the right of 
free movement throughout the United States was to be purchased for any 
substantial number of the evacuees, the price for such purchase would 
have t o  be the detention of all the evacuees while they were sorted 
and classified, and then the continued detention of those found poten- 
t i a l l y  dangerous t o  internal security. The detention policy of WRA 
was born out of a decision that this price would have to  be paid, that 
it was better t o  pay th i s  price than t o  keep all the evacuees i n  indef- 
in i te  detention, and that  to refuse to pay this price would almost cer- 
tainly mean tha t  the prevailing popular fear and distrust could not be 
reasoned with and could not be allayed. 
The Supreme Court was never presented with an opportunity t o  pass 
upon the validity of the mass detention pending sorting. Had the ques- 
tion been presented to it for  decision, the C o u r t  would undoubtedly 
have been disturbed by the length of time it took to complete the sort- 
ing, A detention of a few weeks, perhaps a detention of 4 or 5 months 
considering the size of the to ta l  group, it should not have been too 
diff icult  to  sustain under the circumstances. Although the sorting, 
i n  fact,  took the better part of 2 years, it is true that any ev' 
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who for any reason was par t icular ly  anxious to leave early, could 
arrange t o  secure p r io r i t y  consideration of h i s  request and only a very 
few cases were detained f o r  more than 8 t o 1 0  weeks because of the 
processing of security clearance. 
Before we s t a t e  more fully the lega l  argument i n  defense of such 
detention, l e t  us consider the next type of detention involved since 
many of the same considerations apply t o  both. 
Detention f o r  Employment and Community Acceptance 
Before they could receive permission to leave the center, those 
who received leave clearance needed also  a job ar means of support, 
and needed to be headed for a community which WRA believed will ing and 
capable of accepting evacuees without danger of violence. Was such 
detention valid? 
These conditions t o  departure-that the evacuee s h a l l  have been
found to be nondangerous t o  internal  security, t h a t  he s h a l l  have a 
job or some other means of support, t h a t  there s h a l l  be " c o m m u n i t y  
acceptance" a t  h i s  point of destination, and tha t  he s h a l l  keep the 
Authority no t i f ied  of h i s  changes of address-represented, in, f ac t ,  the 
hear t  of the relocation p r o g r a m .  They were designed t o  make planned 
and orderly  what must otherwise have been helter-skelter and spasmodic. 
The very f a c t  t h a t  112,000 people had been evacuated-and evacuated 
under a cloud-created f o r  the Government a special resettlement prob- 
lem. Had the evacuees been merely innocent victims of a major flood, 
routed from their homes by sher i f f s  and deputies and brought out of the 
danger zone, the Government would inevitably have been compelled t o  take 
appropriate action t o  reestabl ish the flood evacuees without serious 
disruption of the social  fabric. It might wel l  have had t o  detain a l l  
the flood evacuees u n t i l  they were inoculated against disease and u n t i l  
they were provided with the basic  essentials,  and u n t i l  they sa t i s f i ed  
the au thor i t i es  t ha t  they had some place t o  go f o r  i m m e d i a t e  shelter. 
The Government might well  have had to provide temporary she l te r  f o r  
thousands of such evacuees and, i f  so, would have had t o  regulate the  
en t r i e s  and departures from such temporary refuge. The problem w a s  much 
more acute i n  degree in the case of these wartime evacuees. If the  
const i tut ional i ty  of the evacuation i t s e l f  be assumed, the  s i tua t ion  
t h a t  was inevitably created by the evacuation does of i t s e l f  give r i s e  
t o  new problems which Government must undertake t o  solve by appropriate 
means. 
Thus, the conditions attached to departure from the centers 
enabled a s i f t i n g  of a possibly questionable minority from the  who le  
some majority whose relocation it became the principal object of W R A  t o  
achieve. These res t r ic t ions  enabled WRA t o  prepare public opinion 
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in the communities t o  which the evacuees wished t o  go f o r  settlement, so 
a s  to avoid violent incidents, public furor, possible r e t a l i a t i on  against 
Americans in Japanese hands, and other e v i l  consequences. The leave 
regulations "stemmed the flow" they converted what might otherwise be 
a dangerously disordered flood of unwanted people i n t o  unprepared com- 
munities i n t o  a steady, orderly, planned migration in to  communities 
t h a t  gave every promise of being able t o  amalgamate the newcomers with- 
out incidents, and t o  the i r  mutual advantage. The detention, i n  other 
words, was regarded as  a necessary incident t o  t h i s  vital social  
planning. 
D u r i n g  the whole of 1943, WRA fought for  the leave clearance and 
relocation progrm, not against those who charged tha t  t h i s  was an 
unconstitutional interference with the r igh ts  of the evacuees, but 
against those who argued t h a t  only wartime in te rment  of all the eva- 
cuees could adequately safeguard the national security. During 1944 
the r e se t t l ed  evacuees were increasingly winning acceptance, and the 
mil i tary s i tuat ion was steadily improving f o r  the United Nations, and 
public f e a r s  were slowly being quieted, and the Nisei mil i tary exploits  
were gradually becoming known, and the voice of conscience was slowly 
growing louder i n  the land, and cri t icism then began t o  d i rec t  i t s e l f  
against continuation of the detention of those found e l ig ib le  t o  leave. 
During t h i s  period, also, detention of those e l ig ib le  t o  leave became 
more and more a matter of form rather  than of substance. WRA had by 
n o w  succeeded i n  laying the groundwork for  relocation throughout all 
par t s  of the country other than the evacuated area, so t ha t  the re- 
quirement of community acceptance was sa t i s f i ed  i n  advance for  all eva- 
cuees. Similarly, WRA was equipped t o  f ind a job f o r  any evacuee who 
needed help in securing one, so t h a t  the requirement of employment or  
other means of support was sa t i s f ied  i n  advance for  pract ical ly  all 
evacuees. It i s  l i t e r a l l y  true tha t  f o r  the large majority of the eva- 
cuees there  was no detention of evacuees in relocation centers during 
m o s t  of 1 9 4 4  and subsequently, except in form and in theory. Any one 
whose record was sat isfactory not only could leave on request but was 
assisted,  urged and persuaded t o  depart. Relocation of those e l ig ib le  
t o  leave had by then become the objective t o  which much of WRA's appro- 
p r ia t ion  and most of WRA's energies were directed. The assistance con- 
s i s t ed  of transportation t o  the place of destination with a s m a l l  r e -  
settlement grant t o  t i d e  the evacuee over the  adjustment p e r i o d .  
Special dependency cases received special  assistance. 
It was  not  u n t i l  1944 t ha t  the Supreme Court had an opportunity 
t o  pass on the question of the consti tutional va l id i ty  of detention 
of those evacuees who had received leave clearance u n t i l  the require- 
ments of job and community acceptance were sat isf ied.  In  December 
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the Supreme Court delivered i t s  opinion i n  the case of Ex Parte Mitsuye 
Endo, 8 a  pe t i t ion  f o r  the w r i t  of habeas corpus f i l e d  on  behalf of a 
young woman who had received leave clearance but  who refused t o  indi- 
case a destination other than Sacramento, California, from  where she 
had been evacuated. No community in the evacuated area could sa t i s fy  
WRA's requirement of c o m m u n i t y  acceptance since the Army continued t o  
exclude evacuees from returning t o  t h a t  area. Mr. Justice Black,speak- 
ing f o r  the majority of the Court, decided t h a t  it was not necessary 
f o r  the Supreme Court to determine whether such detention was constitu- 
t ional  because, sa id  Mr. Just ice  Black, such detention was not author- 
ized by Executive Order No. 9102 or  any other Executive order or any 
ac t  of Congress. Since Miss Endo, said the Court, was admittedly loyal  
t o  the United States  and not endangering i t s  internal  security, her de- 
tention could not be said  to  be authorized by Executive orders which 
sought t o  guard the West Coast against sabotage and espionage. Mr. 
Justice Roberts dissented on the ground tha t  the Congress and the Presi- 
dent had specif ical ly  been informed of the kind of detention tha t  WRA 
was enforcing, and had r a t i f i e d  and confirmed WRA's interpretation of 
Executive Order No. 9102-the P r e s i d e n t  in a message to the Congress, 
and the Congress i n  appropriations made t o  WRA with knowledge of the  
d e t a i l s  of the program to be financed  with those appropriations. And, 
said Mr. Justice Roberts, as  thus r a t i f i e d  and confirmed by the Con- 
gress, the  detention of nondangerous persons i s  unconstitutional. All 
the members of the  Court thus found themselves in agreement, although 
f o r  different reasons, t ha t  Miss Endo must be ordered a t  once released. 
WRA immediately l i f t e d  i t s  requirements of means of support and com- 
munity acceptance. 
The decision of the C o u r t  i n  the E n d o  case came 48 hours subse- 
quent t o  the announcement by the Army that t he  exclusion orders were 
being revoked. The revocation of the exclusion orders was coupled with 
termination of the leave regulations. Thereafter, with the exception 
of those detained by the War Department or the Department of Justice,  
nearly all of whom had by then been transferred t o  the  Tule Lake Segre- 
gation Center, the  evacuees were f ree  t o  leave the centers a t  w i l l . ,  A 
short time later the military guards were removed and the A u t h o r i t y ' s  
program in tens i f ied  its e f fo r t  t o  persuade the remaining evacuees t o  
relocate. 
Detention of Those Deemed Inel igible  t o  Leave 
The only aspect of the  detention program which the Supreme Court 
was asked t o  pass upon was detention of those who, l i k e  Miss Endo, had 
received leave clearance. The Court never ruled on the va l id i ty  of de- 
ta ining  all  evacuees while they were being sorted nor on the va l id i ty  
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of detention of those deemed inel igible  t o  leave.. 
WRA took the position t h a t  it sought t o  detain those deemed ineli- 
gible t o  leave until after all those deemed e l ig ib le  had been relocated. 
Such detention, i t  maintained,  was necessary t o  build public acceptance 
of those found e l ig ib le  t o  relocate. The detention was thus regarded 
as  an essent ia l  step in the accomplishment of the relocation objective. 
Since the war  ended before relocation of the e l ig ib les  had been con- 
pleted, the Government never had t o  face the question of whether it 
could or would attempt to detain those deemed inel igible  a f t e r  the re- 
location objective had been fully achieved. In the period f rom  December 
1944 t o  February 1945 many of the detainees renounced their  c i t i zen -  
ship. After revocation of the  exclusion orders, and on termination of , 
W R A ' s  sorting processes, the W a r  Department and the Department of 
Just ice  assumed responsibil i ty for determining who should remain in de- 
tention. Those Departments detained fo r  a time most of the renunciants 
but released from detentionall citizens  formerly detained who had not 
renounced the i r  c i t i z e n s h i p  T h e  r e v o c a t i o n of the exclusion orders 
was thus fo l lowed  beforevery long by  the  termination of the detention 
of citizens. 
H o w  Long was Continued Exclusion Constitutional? 
The argument for the consti tutionali ty of evacuation summarized 
above l a i d  great emphasis upon the mil i tary s i tuat ion tha t  obtained i n  
the winter, spring, and early summer of 1942. Clearly, as  the military 
s i tuat ion improved, as the danger of invasion of the West Coast by the 
Japanese Army receded, and as the processes of sorting the evacuees in- 
t o  e l ig ib le  a n d  inel igible  categories were completed, the arguments for 
the mili tary necessity for the evacuation program became deeply af- 
fected. The exclusion orders were not revoked u n t i l  December 1 9 4 4 .  
It seems clear  t o  the point of certainty tha t  the mili tary s i tuat ion 
had so far improved a s  t o  make continued exclusion no longer val id  
many months, and perhaps more than a year, before the exclusion orders 
themselves were f i n a l l y  revoked, It remains true,  nevertheless, tha t  
the assignment of the precise hour when the mil i tary balance so far 
shifted tha t  evacuation ceased t o  be a mil i tary necessity i s  a d i f f i -  
cu l t  task. The courts would understandably hesi ta te  t o  substi tute 
t he i r  judgment on such an issue fo r  the judgment of the responsible 
mili tary commanders. If the delay i n  revocation was longer than it 
need have been, it w a s  not so much longer as it wel l  might have been. 
The orders were revoked m o r e  than 6 months before the end of the war 
w i t h  Japan. 
During the months pr ior  t o  revocation of the  exclusion orders, any 
relocated evacuee might have sought to return t o  the excluded area, 
and if physically in te r fe red  with  by the Army might have sought to 
res t ra in  such interfereace in the courts on the ground tha t  continued 
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exclusion had ceased t o  be a mil i tary necessity and hence had ceased t o  
be valid. It is a str iking f ac t  t h a t  not one such s u i t  was f i l e d  al- 
though such return was a f e w  times attempted and prevented. 9 
The S t r a t e g y  for Litigation 
I n  1942 and ear ly  in 1 9 4 3 ,  while public feeling s t i l l  ran strong 
and the mili tary s i tuat ion s t i l l  looked dark, the Authority's lawyers 
believed tha t  it was undesirable f o r  cases tes t ing the const i tut ional i ty  
of evacuation and of detention t o  be hurried to  the Supreme Court. 
Decision on such complicated  questions can be more soundly conceived 
when the atmosphere has been freed of the surcharged emotions generated 
by the dangers and tensions of war .  The Authority, of course, could 
not and did not seek in any w a y  t o  interfere  with the freedom of eva- 
cuees to have recourse t o  the courts for  redress of the i r  grievances. 
But those evacuees or fr iends of the evacuees who sought the advice of 
the Authority were advised that the nicet ies  of individual l i be r ty  would 
receive correspondingly fu l l e r  at tention and protection as the Nation's 
c r i s i s  was passed, as  the mil i tary si tuation improved, and a s  people 
generally were able to breathe more easi ly  ard t h i n k  more soberly. This 
remained the advice of the Authority throughout the ear ly  period. 
D u r i n g  what might be called the "middle period" the Authority ad- 
vised tha t  the time had come for  f ree  testing of these issues i n  the 
courts. It indicated i t s  willingness to cooperate i n  the submission to  
the courts of well chosen " tes t  cases" tha t  would f a i r l y  and adequately 
present the issues for decision. It quickly became clear tha t  the eva- 
cuees generally shunned lega l  confl ic t  with the Government. Most of 
the evacuees apparently took the position that  the i r  future i n  the United 
States  might be imperiled by large-scale l i t i ga t ion  challenging the 
evacuation and challenging the detention tha t  was a par t  of the reloca- 
t ion program. It is t h i s  f ac t  that  accounts for  the f a i l u re  t o  bring 
t o  the Supreme Court cases tha t  would adequately have tested the valid- 
i t y  of the various kinds and classes of detention discussed i n  this 
report. 
Also-during t h i s  middle per iod  the  Authority faced the question 
of revising its leave regulations to eliminate the requirement t h a t  an 
evacuee who had received leave clearance be possessed of a job or other 
9 There was one attempt in l a t e  1944 t o  t e s t  the va l id i ty  of continued 
exclusion by an action to  res t ra in  interference with anticipated return. 
The W a r  Department exempted the peti t ioners from the mass exclusion or- 
ders, thus precluding a decision on those orders, and issued individual 
exclusion orders which the Court refused to  invalidate. Ochikubo v. 
Bonesteel, Dis t r ic t  Court of the United States,  Southern Di s t r i c t  of 
California, Central Division, No. 3834-pH (1945). 
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means of support and be headed for  a community willing t o  receive him. 
Opponents of the relocation program were s t i l l  continuing a heated 
attack on the Authority, charging tha t  the leave regulations were too 
l ax  and permitted too many p o p l e  to leave the centers. The Authority 
would have welcomed a C o u r t  decision tes t ing  the va l id i ty  of continuing 
t o  impose these requirements. The Endo case, referred t o  above, for- 
tunately met pa r t  of t h i s  need. W h e n  t h e   Department of Justice con- 
sidered rendering the case moot, the  Authority protested. The pendency 
of t h i s  case i n  the Supreme Court thus postponed for  several months the 
necessity f o r  deciding whether to eliminate these requirements from the 
leave regulations. I n  Decmber of 1944 the decision i n  the Endo case 
eliminated these requirements, and the revocation of the r e s t  o f   the 
leave regulations soon followed. 
I n  the f ina l  year of the  operation of relocation centers detention 
by WRA was no longer the issue to be tested. Now the issue became 
whether the Department of Justice had the lega l  authority t o  detain and 
deport evacuees who had renounced their  American cit izenship and who 
now sought to remain i n  the United States. A large number of su i t s  t o  
t e s t  t h i s  question were f i l e d  during 1945 i n  the  Federal d i s t r i c t  
courts, were consolidated for purposes of trial, and a s  this i s  writ ten 
s t i l l  await trial. 
The convictions of the Authority on these lega l  issues  may be here 
b r i e f ly  s u m m a r i z e d .  It believed, a s  indicated above t ha t  the evacua- 
t ion,  however unwise i n  fac t ,  h o w e v e r  unnecessary subsequent events 
proved it t o  be, was within the consti tutional pmer  of the Federal 
Government when undertaken and executed. It doubted from the beginning 
and never ceased to doubt the va l id i ty  of the detention procedures. 
The detention procedures were adopted out of a conviction tha t  no other 
course was administratively open or feasible, and tha t  the administra- 
t ion  must f o l l o w  its only available course when the unconstitutionality 
of tha t  course is no more than a matter of speculation and uncertainty. 
The detention of all the evacuees for a preliminary period pending 
the i r  sor t ingand class i f icat ion did not seem e i ther  too great a hard- 
ship for the evacuees t o  be subjected t o  or a course too d i f f i cu l t  t o  
defend in the courts. The detention of those deemed e l ig ib le  to leave 
u n t i l  they found jobs and u n t i l  communities w e r e  prepared t o  receive 
them was deemed much more doubtful as  to constitutional val idi ty  but 
was a lso recognized t o  be a course pursued in the in t e r e s t  of the 
evacuees themselves and to be a course of action for  which there was  
much t o  be said even on the issue of consti tutional validity. The de- 
tention of those deemed inel igible  to leave, the Authority f e l t ,  was 
an ac t iv i ty  pract ical ly  forced upon it and which it had no alternative 
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LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTER
 MANAGEMENT POLICIE S *
The Geneva  Convention 
One of the questions early confrontitng the Authority was the de- 
gree to which the administration of the centers should conform to  the 
provisions of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War. Both the 
United States and Japan were s i g n a t o r y  p o w e r s ,  and the Convention was 
rat if ied by the United States i n  1932. The Japanese Govemnent did 
not, however ,  ra t i fy  the Convention and under the povisions of Article 
92 of the Convention it was not effective w i t h  respect to Japan. Hence 
the United States Government was not bound to observe the terms of the 
Convention in its treatment of prisoners of war. 
Concern over the treatment of American prisoners of w a r  and civil- 
ians i n  Japanese hands, however, prompted a different policy. Early 
in the war the State Department obtained the Japanese Government's 
agreement to reciprocal application of the provisions of the Convention 
to prisoners of war,  and insofar as the provisions of the Convention 
were adaptable, t o  "civilian internees." Withrespect t o  Japanese 
civilians in this country, the State Department construed the term 
"civilian internees" as  referring to alien enemies interned pursuant 
to the Presidential proclamat ions  i s s u e d  under authority of the Alien 
Enemy Act, as  amended, and not to Japanese nationals included in the 
population moved t o relocation centars.  2 Nevertheless, as theprogram 
of the Authority developed, with its limited detention features, it was 
apparent that standards of treatmat a t  leas t  substantially equivalent 
to those guaranteed by the Convention should be observed, i f  only t o  
avoid giving the Japanese Government any pretext for r e p r i s a l  in the 
treatment of American civilians i n  the hands of the Japanese. 
*  This section is  largely adapted from "The Lawof the W a r  Relocation 
Centers, " an art icle prepared by the Solicitorand a former Assistant 
Solicitor of WRA and published in the June 1946 issue of the George 
Washington Law Reviw. 
I. 
47 Stat. 2021. 
2 Hearings beforeS u b c o m m i t t e e  of the Senate on Military Af- 
fairs on S. , 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) Part I, pp. 113, 119.                             (18)  
Thus, for  example, w i t h  respect t o  sanitation, medical care, hous- 
ing, religious freedom, and recreational opportunities, the Convention 
requirements were met (Arts. 9, 10, 13-17). The evacuees operated their 
own canteens and stores and received a l l  profits (Art. 12). Under 
authority of the annual WRA appropriation items, relevant provisions of 
the United States Rnployees Compensation Act were applicable i n  case of 
accidental injury or death of evacuee workers (Art. 27). Because of 
the Convention provision that labor furnished by w a r  prisoners shall have 
no direct relation with w a r  operations (Art. 31), WRA refused t o  permit 
Japanese aliens to work on camouflage net garnishing projects or other 
directly war-connected act ivi t ies i n  the centers. 
In other respects, however, there were varying degrees of departure 
from the literal requirements of the Convention--departure made neces- 
sary or advisable by the character of the program  i tself .  Thus, the 
per capita food ration, while adequate and nourishing, never equalled 
i n  cost that  provided members of the armed forces ( A r t .  l l ) .  Larger 
quantities would have been wasted because of the number of women and 
children and the sedentary l i f e  of most of the evacuees. On the other 
hand, special diets for infants and the infrim were provided. A t  the 
same time OPA r a t i o n i n g  regulations were observed. Clothing was not 
furnished directly (Art. 12), but cash clothing allwances were paid 
evacuee workers for  themselves and families, and welfare grants, in- 
cluding money for accessory clothing, were paid needy unemployables. 
T h i s  s t e m m e d  frm the policy to encourage evacuee employment and thus 
prevent deterioration of ini t iat ive and trade skills, provide maxium 
outlet for constructive  activity, and decrease administrative problems. 
Under the Convention, prisoners of w a r  are subject to  "the laws. 
regulations, and orders i n  force i n  the armies of the detaining p o w e r "  
(Art. 45). Insofar as this permitted trial and punishnent under m i l i -  
tary l aw  it was clearly unadaptable to evacuees in relocation centers. 
Instead, WRA handled its disciplinary problems through the State and 
Federal courts, i n  the more serious cases, and through administrative 
action where lesser offenses were involved. With respect t o  adminis- 
t rat ive disciplinary action, the Convention prohibited confinement 
exceeding 30 days a t  any one tima and the transfer of prisoners of war  
to  prisons or penitentiaries for disciplinary punishnent (Arts. 5h, 
56). The Authority's administrative disciplinary procedure authorized 
confinement fo r  not exceeding 90 days fo r  each offense, and local jails 
outside the centers were generally utilized for that purpose. Never- 
theless, the provisions of the Convention guaranteeing elements of due 
process (Arts. 46-48, 52, 59, 60-67 and protecting the welfare of per- 
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in all substantial  respects.3 Advance notification was given the State 
Department of all criminal proceedings ins t i tu ted  against aliens (Art. 
60) 
There were, i n  addition, certain practices permitted by the Con- 
vention which for  lega l  as well as administrative reasons were not in- 
sti tuted, One was the u t i l iza t ion  of involuntary labor (Arts. 27-30), 
which would clear ly have been unconstitutianal with respect to the 
American ci t izens and resident a l iens who comprised the evacuee popula- 
tion. Another was the res t r ic t ion  on the amount of money t h a t  prisoners 
of w a r  could keep i n  the i r  possession (Cf. A r t .  24). S t i l l  another was 
the censorship of mail. 
Pursuant to Articles 42 and 43, the a l ien  evacuees i n  relocation 
centers were permitted freely t o  communicate with the Spanish Embassy, 
and periodic visits of inspection were made by representatives of the 
Embassy with respect to which WRA cooperated fully. No significant 
modifications i n  policy were recommended by the Embassy  as a r e su l t  of 
these visits. 
State and Federal Jurisdiction 
Another problem facing the War Relocation Authority was the scope 
of State  and Federal jurisdiction over the lands on which the reloca- 
t ion centers were situated. The f i r s t  question that needed t o  be re- 
solved was  the extent to  which the Federal Government had already 
acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the lands. 
Exclusive jurisdiction could have been acquired i n  any of three 
ways:  reservation of jurisdiction over the lands involved a t  the time 
the State was admitted in to  the Union; Federal purchase with State  con- 
sent for  the purposes enumerated i n  Article I, section 3, clause 17 of 
the Federal Constitution; or express cession of jurisdiction by the 
State  legislature. Acquisition of land under a State consent or cession 
law does not, however, autmatical ly  vest  exclusive jurisdiction i n  the 
Federal Government; there must be a Federal i n t en t  t o  accept such juris- 
diction. A s  t o  lands acquired a f t e r  1940, there is  a conclusive statu- 
tory presumption that exclusive jurisdiction i s  not accepted u n t i l  the 
head of the Federal agency f i l e s  a notice of acceptance with the 
Governor  of the Sta te .4  
Five of the relocation cen te r s  were situated on lands made avail- 
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possible that exclusive jurisdiction had already been obtained. An 
examination of the r e c o r d  revealed, however, t h a t  this was not the case, 
Three of the centers were located on Federal r e c l a m a t i o n  lands, Most of 
these lands at  t w o  of these centers (Mindoka and Heart M o u n t a i n )  was 
public domain, which f e l l  outside the scope of the State consent and 
cession s ta tu tes  involved, and ju r i sd ic t ion  had not been reserved i n  
the United S t a t e s  by the e n a b l i n g  acts  under which the States were ad- 
mitted to the  Union. A t  the th i rd  center (Tule L a k e ) ,  most of the land 
involved had been transferred t o  the United States by the State for 
reclamation purposes; it was exceedingly  doubtful whether the general 
S t a t e  consent and cession statutes were applicable t o  this type of 
Federal a c q u i s i t i o n ,  and even i f  t hey  were ,  exclusive jurisdiction had 
not been acceptad, Two other centers were constructed on Indian reser- 
vation lands i n  A r i z o n a ,  Despite a provis ion  in the State enabling act  
reserving "absolute" Federal ju r i sd ic t ion  and control of Indian lands 
as against the State, this provision had been construed to be a reten- 
t ion of jurisdiction over Indian affairs  rather than a. reservation of 
t e r r i t o r i a l  sovereignty. 
The lands for the remaining cen te r s  had been acquired by purchase, 
lease, or use condemntation directly from non-Federal sources fo r  u t i l i -  
zation as relocation centers.5 Since acquisition in these  cases f o l l o w e d  
the  enactment of the new law governing acceptance of jurisdiction, it 
was clear that exclusive jurisdiction had not ben obtained and could 
not be obtained without the f i l i n g  of notices of acceptance with the  
respective State  authorities. 
Exclusive Jurisdiction not having been acquired in any case, the 
question arose of whether the Authority should seek exclusive jurisdic- 
tion, The policy decision was in the negative. In the f i r s t  place it 
was doubtful i n  the case of several centers whether the Authority could 
have acquired exclus ive  j u r i s d i c t i o n  by filing a notice of acceptance, 
This w a s  true, for example, of the centerswhich consisted largely of 
public domain l a n d s  It also semed true of the centers on land over 
which possession was acquired by lease  or by use condemination. Unless 
advantages accrued from acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction a t  the 
remaining centers that  offset  the desirability of unifomity of adminis- 
t r a t ive  policy and procedure a t  all centers, it was obvious t h a t  ex- 
clusive jurisdiction should not be sought. 
5 Purchase: Granada (Colorado); Central Utah (Utah); the center site 
proper a t  Rohwer  ( Arkansas ).  Lease:  Jerome (Arkansas); remainder of 
lands a t   R h o w e r .  Use condemnation:Manzanar (California). Small 
t r a c t s  were  also purchased  a t  Tule Lake (California) and Heart Mountain 
( Wyoming ).
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It became apparent tha t  there were actually no advantages to  be ob- 
tained f r o m  exclusive jurisdiction and that there were positive dis- 
advantages, The supposed promise of a more integral system of Juris-- 
prudence, for example, was an illlusion. Congress has never legislated 
a,comprehensive code of law  for  areas under exclusive Federal juris- 
diction, Instead, there is in  effect a limited number of Federal 
statutes defining major crimes on exclusive jurisdlictlon lands, plus 
a general a s s i m u l a t i o n  crime statute adopting the criminal law of the 
S t a t e  i n  effect on F e b r u a r y  1 , 1940, w i t h  respect to  all other criminal  
offenses, There is no pa ra l l e l  assimulation statute cover5ng private 
rights, a n d  those rights are determined by the State laws in effect a t  
the time af accession of exclusive jurisdictian, without benefit of 
impromments made thereafter by the Sta te  legislature, In other res- 
pects the acquisition of exclusive jurisdiction would have complicated 
instead of  simplifying  administration. The States and counties would 
have been under no obligation to continue road maintence or police 
protection, provide school fac i l i t i e s  for children of administrative 
personnel, or furnish other services under available working institu- 
tiona and procedureas in the f i e ld  of persmal relations, probate, 
coroners, vital s ta t is t ics ,  institutionaliriatian of mental cases, and 
similar matters. This would have meant bcraased expense to the 
Goverrrment and improvisation of procedures which would have been un- 
wieldy and only partially satisfactory a t  best.  Furthermore, mainten- 
ance of an organic relationship with local institutions  was valuable t o  
dispel local suspicion and misunderstanding that  grew out of the evacua- 
tion. By utilizing State and local services, normal contacts between 
the evacuees and the outside world could be multiplied and encouraged 
and the center i t s e l f  could became t o  a greater extent part of the l i f e  
of the local community. 
Finally, the fai lure t o  acquire exclusive jurisdiction would not 
mean an impingement of State authority that would hinder WRA in its 
program, in view of the now settled rule that State l a w  may not con- 
stitutionally operate so as to interfere substantially with the Federal 
Government's performance of its proper governmental functions. On the 
other hand, if a S t a t e  l a w  does not substantially i n t e r f e r e  w i t h  the 
performance of the Federal. govermental function, the decisions impose 
no barrier t o  the application of that  law to Federal activi t ies carried 
on a t  a place where exclusive Federal jurisdiction does not exist. The 
constitutional concept is one d signed to allow each government a maxi- 
mum of freedom. State law need not step aside unless its intrusion 
upon the Federal. f u n c t i o n  would tend t o  bar the road t o  performance. 
So, in the r e l o c a t i o n  centers, State criminal laws were enforced, 
S t a t e  laws concerning marriage and divorce and the custody of children 
were observed and e n f o r c e d ,  contracts were made and their validity  
was determined by the local. law, and the validity of wil l s ,  distribution 
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of estates of intestates, and the form or probate proceedings were 
determined by the l a w  of the l o c a l  jurisdiction  t o  the same extent as 
would have been the case fo r  persons temporarily residing in any other 
parts of the same States. 
State occupational licensing l a w s ,  on the other hand, were not en- 
forced. To have enforced these would have rendered it practically im- 
possible for the Government to  administer the relocation centers i n  
accordance with the program worked out by the War Relocation Authority. 
Most of the physicians and surgeons who cared for  the health of the 
evacuees, for example, were themselves evacuees who were licensed t o  
practice medicine i n  the West Coast States from which they came but 
were not licensed in the States where the centers were located, If 
they had been barred from the practice of medicine a t  the centers unt i l  
they were able to comply w i t h  the licensing laws, reciprocal or other- 
wise, of the new State, the Government would have had to  hire a con- 
siderable number of l o c a l  doctors a t  a time when there was a serious 
shortage of medical practitioners i n  most communities, while competent 
evacuee physicians would have been forced t o  remain idle. The same 
thing would have been true of dentists, optometrists, nurses, and a 
dozen other licensed businesses and professions. In each of these 
l ines of work evacuees were available and anxious t o  render needed 
services, and their  competency and qualificatbns were deemed suffi- 
cient by the Authority, In  these circumstances immunity from State 
control was clear. Similarly, i n  various other phases of center opera- 
tions the Authority did not regard State laws t o  be applicable. This 
was true, for example, i n  the licensing of automobiles and drivers, 
the inspection of center-produced meat, the crating and shipment  of 
vegetablss, the developnent of health and sanitation standards, and the 
adoption af an evacuee employment policy. 
The Authority's claim of governmenta l  immunity in such matters was 
never seriously questioned. The State agencies, by and large, con- 
sciously or unconsciously follwed a hands-off policy. A greater possi- 
bi l i ty  of friction existed i n  the additional burdens that were thrown 
upon the States and counties in such matters as l aw enforcement, utili- 
zation of courts for  probate and other evacuee litigation, schooling for 
children of administrative personnel, i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n  of evacuee 
insane, and l ike services. No appreciable difficulty arose anywhere. 
In part t h i s  was  because the largest single  i t e m  of expense-- the  hand- 
ling of law enforcement problems--was largely eliminatedthrough WRA 
administrative handling of minor offenses in the  centers.  In part the 
r e s u l t  can also be attributed t o  the fact  that the remaining burden  
was more than offset by the financial benefits accruing to the States 
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Community Government 
The Power to Establish Community  Government 
From  the time that  the e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of relocation centers was 
determined upon, it was recognized that the War Relocation Authority 
would face a major problem in the governing of the centers. A t  the 
same time it was realized that the practical problems involved would be 
substantially lessened if a major share o f  t h e  responsibility f o r  
orderly conduct of community life could be undertaken by the evacuees 
themselves. Incorporation of a m u n i c a p a l i t y  under State l a w  was out of 
the question. Even i f  the evacuees had had the necessary local  citizen-  
ship and resddence requirements, a municipal government would inevitably 
have conflicted i n  numerous unpredictable ways with the paramount obli- 
gations of the Federal administration. Instead, the pol i t ica l  structure 
evolved for  the goverment of the centers was predicated upon the  admin- 
istrhltive power to establish  and protect a l l  forms of the Federal func- 
tion, with part ial  delegation of tha t  power t o  the evacuees. 
Ekercise of the administrative control necessary for  the success- 
f u l  ma&ntmance of the Federal operations involved is a normal c o r o ~  
to the pmes t o  eqage  i n  them. A pmer t o  engage in a given a c t i v i t y  
does not, of course, carry with it bci&n%-a pmer t o  do anything what- 
ever that  m e  night dem u s e N  or  desirable, but it does carry w i t h  it 
the 5ncLdental pmer t o  d6 whatever is substantially necessary t o  the 
e f f ic ien t  conduct of the permitted activity. Furthermore; a reasonable 
dfscreP?h~n is allawed to those administe~ing the ac t iv i ty  to  choose 
mg: varionw possibly practicable f o m s  of regulation, and even t o  de- 
cide what  degree of regulation is  actua3J.y necessary. This is not an 
instance of @FedersL~jwisdic%i&ra~@ in the judicial  sense, but rather 
ttFedessP acemfnislxationE of const i tut imaUy permissible Federal acti- 
vit iea.  B e  derivative regulatory pmer does not deny the existence 
of normal State jurisdiction, c i v i l  end criminal, over the persons and 
any lands involved, except insofar as rimy be necessary i n  the cirmm- 
stances far the  f u l l  and effectEve discharge of the Federal purpose. 
The regulatory power so derived carrPes w i t h  it the power t o  im- 
pose sanctions. Every addnis tza t ivs  agency has been faced with the  
necessity of lqying d m  rulee for tke regulation of persons and things 
within its control, det- whether those m l e s  have, been observed, 
and prescribing and enforcing; aanct%ms as  means of .inducing obser- 
vance, It i s  perfectly true tha t  this involves action of a quasi- 
Legislative and quasi-judicial nature, but the cons%itutional doc-brPne 
of separation of powers has long since been W d e d  t o  pennat this 
essential aspect of Goverment achnhistration. 
The Federal operation being undertaken here was the maintenance and 
supervision of 110,000 persons in 10 sepera te  communities. O b v i o u s l y  a
program of such magnitude imposed  large responsibil i t ies upon the 
Federal agency in charge t o  provide f o o d  and housing, create all. neces- 
sary forms of communal  services, prescribe and enforce standards of 
health, sani tat ion,  and fire prevention, and take such other measures 
as might be necessary t o  i n s u r e  the welfare of the inhabitants and pro- 
t ec t  the Federal property involved. These responsibilities, and the 
corresponding power  t o  meet them, necessarily carried with them the 
authori ty  t o  protect the funct ions  involved by the issuance of appro- 
priate police regulations and the enforcement of sanctions fo r  noncom- 
pliance. 
Administrative agencies having  functions rather similar t o  those 
of the War Relocation Authority so f a r  as  legal considerations are  con-
cerned are  not uncommon. Any instance in which a self-contained organi-  
sation o r  group somewhat removed from the ordinary social  controls i s  
set up under authority of law presents a legal situation comparable 
t o  t h a t  of a relocation center. PubLic schools, colleges, and u n i v e r -  
s i t i e s  operated under State  l a w  a r e  similar, in tha t  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
controls are  normally given t o  a president or board of trustees w i t h  
power  i n  turn t o  delegate authority dealing with administrative m a t t e r s  
and with disciplining of others with in  the organizat!ion. The  same is 
true i n  m a n y  types of publicly operated hospitals, espec id ly  those i n  
which admission and dischqge are not wholly within the control of the 
patients. Various sorts  of asylums and quarantine stations a r e  of the 
same character, and the situation of seamen on ships a t  sea is s imi la r .  
The public school cases probably present the closest analogy. A 
typical case i s  tha t  i n  which a teacher or school of f ic ia l  i s  sued by 
a pupil for  damages on account of punishent inflicted f o r  vio la t ion  of 
a disciplinary rule, The cases are unanimous in holding that such rules 
are valid and t h a t  their  enforcement i s  valid, provided netther the 
rule nor its enforcement goes beyond the limits of "reasonableness" 
The power ex is t s  as  a matter of common law; express s ta tutes  merely con- 
firm it. It i s  a part of the  power to m a i n t a i n  schools, because it is 
essential  t o  the successful maintenance of schools,  It is sometimes 
said t ha t  the power of  school authorit ies t o  make and enforce d i sc ip -  
linary ru les  is  based on the idea that the teacher stands in loco 
parentis, but this is misleading.  Actually, the teacher's authority
is not based merely on a delegation of parental power; it e x i s t s  even 
though it is expressly denied by the parents.  Rather it i s  der ived  
from the s t a t e  as parens patriae.  It is an authority t o  enforce dis-
c i p l i n e  within a State administrative agency, based i n  the l a s t  ana- 
lysis upon the police power just as much as is a compulsory school attendance law, a compulsory vaccination law, or the perati n of the public school system i t se l f .  
The legal bases for promulgation and enforcement of disciplinary 
rules  i n  prisons are substantially the same as in public schools. A" 
legislature, State or Federal, may lay d o w n  rules designed t o  achieve 
good order i n  prisons, or it may confer the  p o w e r  to  l ay  down such 
ru les  and enforce them upon the warden or other a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  o f f i c i a l  
i n  charge of the prison. Ifthe legis lature  is s i l en t  in refernce to 
such rules,  the very f a c t  of its creating a prison or prison system con- 
f e r s  upon the persons who are  lawfully placed i n  charge thereof the duty 
t o  make such ru les  and enforce them. The person i n  charge has the power 
to supplement rules  expressly laid down by the legislature if these 
ru les  do not take care of all the disciplinary situations which arise. 
The only l i m i t a t i o n  upon the administrator's powers, whether in respect 
t o  rule making or enforcement, apart from express legis lat ive negatives, 
i s  tha t  unnecessary harshness i s  not permissible. This is  like the re- 
quirement t ha t  disciplinary measures governing pupils i n  schools must 
not be unreasonable under the c i rmstances .  The ru le  in both its 
applications consti tutes an implied limitation on administrative powers 
and is derived from the common law rather than from the constitutional 
prohibition of the eighth amendment against cruel. and unusual punish- 
ment, though the amendment also constitutes a limitation on adminis- 
t r a t ive  as well as on other types of lega l  power. Similar authority 
exists for the imposition and enforcement of disciplinary rules  i n  
hospitals maintained by the Veterans Administration, also for  other 
types of hospitals maintained by the Federal Government. 
In the case of the War Relocatian Authority, the Director's power 
to  make discipl inary  ru les  was conferred by Executive Order No. 9102, 
buttressed by congressional recognition contained i n  subsequent appro- 
priation acts. Even without a n y  e x p r e s s  grant of rule-making power t o  
the Director or any other o f f i c i a l  in it, however, the inherent neces- 
s i t y  f o r  the promulgation and enforcement of rules  to maintain order 
and protect property a t  relocation centers would have authorized the 
regulations just  as complebly as did the express language of the 
Executive order. 
 
Police Regulations  
Police regulations in effect  at the centers were promulgated at  
one of three levels-by the na t iona l  office, by the project director, 
or, where community government was operative, by the evacuee cormrmnity 
council. The most important of the regulations prescribed for all 
centers by the national office were those relating t o  "internal 
security"--regulations defining certain acts  deemed offenses against 
canter law and order and authorizing each project director t o  define 
other offenses and provide for the i r  punishment w i t h i n  certain limita- 
t ions  hereinafter discussed, I n  addition, the national office 
prescribed a comprehensive code of f i r e  prevention regulations. 
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Supplemental center regulations varied somewhat from center t o  center, 
but i n  general they included a detailed t r a f f i c  code and a prohibition 
against the manufacture or use of alcoholic beverages, After the Tule 
Lake center became a segregation center, demonstrations and pressure 
t ac t i c s  of pro-Japanese organizations tha t  sprang up prompted the issu- 
ance and enforcement of special regula t ions  prohibiting overt Japanese 
nat ional is t ic  ac t iv i t i e s  which these organizations sponsored. 
The police force (known as  internal  security officers) at  each 
center was direct ly  responsible t o  the projec t  director, whether or 
not a community government plan was i n  operation, The forceconsisted 
of a chief of internal security, several other  Caucasian officers, and 
evacuees, These off icers  had the usual functions of police officers-- 
the investigation of a l l  reports of violations of l a w  or regulations 
coming t o  their attention; the a r res t  of persons observed by them t o  be 
violating laws or  regulations; prevention of violations whenever 
possible; and l ia ison w i t h  Federal intelligence agencies, Arrests w i t h -  
out administrative warrant from the project director were permissible 
only where the offense was c o m m i t t e d  in the presence of the arresting 
off icer  or where the evacuee had confessed to  c o m m i s s i o n  of an offense, 
I n  a l l  other cases, the project director was r equ i red  t o  issue a warrant 
of a r res t ,  after compliance with a procedure providing the safeguards 
required by usual concepts of due process, before an arrest c o u l d  be 
made. 
In the case of an offense that was a felony under State  law, the 
project directar w a s  required t o  turn the offender over t o  the appro- 
p r i a t e  State l a w  enforcement officer, unless it w a s  agreed between them 
tha t  the case could be be t te r  handled on the center, o r  it was  improb- 
able t ha t  prosecution of the felony would r e su l t  in convic t ion ,  or the 
offense was a felony under State  law but only a misdemeanor under 
Federal law. A similar regulation applied to felonies under Federal 
law. In the f i e l d  of misdeaneanors, the project director could e lec t  
to try them as  a violation of the center regulations or  re fer  them t o  
the appropriate law enforcing agency, except that,  where the offense 
was a violation of a c o m m u n i t y  council regulation, the offender was  to 
be t r i e d  before the evacuee judicial  commission. Where the offense 
was purely one against WRA regulations and no violation of State or  
Federa l  criminal s ta tu tes  was involved, the project director  was  
directed to proceed under h i s  disciplinary powers, or re fer  the case 
to the judicial  c o m m i s s i o n  if theregulation was one adopted by the 
community  council. 
Within 48 hours after an arrest ,  the case was required to be re- 
ferred t o  S ta te  or Federal authorities, the project director, or tbe 
ddicial commission. Hearings by the project d i r e c t o r  or judicial  
commissionwere required t o  be held promptly; pending trial, the 
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defendant was released on h i s  own recognizance unless the project di- 
rector believed t h a t  the internal  security of the center would be ad- 
versely affected by such a release and s tated h i s  reasons i n  the 
record. The project director was required t o  hear personally  the cases 
referred t o  him; he could issue administrative subpoenas for  necessary 
witnesses and punish re fusa l  to a p p e a r  or t o  tes t i fy ,  He was respon-s
ible  for  seeing t ha t  a complete case w a s  f a i r l y  presented, under a 
procedure insuring the defendant's r i gh t  t o  counsel and an opportunity 
t o  present h i s  case fu l ly  and cross-exanine witnesses, Hearings were 
required t o  be public except where the nature of the testimony or simi- 
lar circumstances made the procedure inappropriate. 
The maximum penalty that  could be imposed  by the project director,  
i n  the exercise of h is  disciplinary powers, forcommission of an offense 
was imprisonmentment for not more than 3 months. He could permit a defend- 
ant t o  pay a f i n e  not t o  exceed $300 as  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  serving a sen- 
tence of imprisonment, or impose "other suitable punishments, except the 
performance without pay of work f o r  which the defendent  regularly 
employed." 6 
Was the p r o m u l g a t i o n  of these regulations reasonably necessary to 
the effectuation of the Federal program? With respect t o  the  f i re  
prevention regulations,  the t r a f f i c  codes, and certain other restr ic-  
t ions there simply were no applicable State or Fedaral statutes. 
Clearly there could be no question here of the need for  the regulations, 
It is true, however, t ha t  most of the offenses def ined  by  the internal 
security regulations were also misdemeanors under State law. The power 
t o  prescribe administrative regulations in the furtherance of a Federal 
function i s  not dependent, however, on the nonexistenceof State s ta t-  
utes which provide sanctions against the conduct being proscribed. 
Criminal s ta tu tes  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  breach of thep e a c e  orassualt, f o r  
example, do not prevent school administrators or pr i s ion  wardens from 
6 The maximum sentence was seldom imposed, and then only i n  aggravated 
circumstances; i n  pet ty  cases f i rs t  offenders  were generally given no 
more than suspended sentences. "Other suitable punishments" included 
special  work projects or other restr ic t ions  in l i e u  of confinement for 
adult offenders, but were more generally ut i l ized  to  cope w i t h  a 
"zoot-suit" juvenile  delinquency problem tha t  arose as a re su l t  of ab- 
normal family living conditions and the gradual outward movement of 
family bread winners, A typical "suitable punishment" in such cases 
w a s  a hair clipping, an injunction against fur ther  zoo t - su i t  garb, 
and parole to a responsible evacuee or WRA s t a f f  member.  It is  a 
notable f a c t  that, except in times of center-wide  emotional  stress, the 
incidence of crime in the centers was cons iderably  lower than i n  the 
normal American community. 
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proceeding under the i r  own disciplinary authority. The t e s t  is whether 
the auxiliary disciplinary authority i s  substantially necessary t o  the 
e f f ic ien t  conduct of the permitted activity.  
Reliance on State and local authorit ies for  law and order enforce- 
ment i n  the centers would have been unwieldy and fraught with adminis- 
t ra t ive  hazard. The centers were located i n  relat ively poor and very 
sparsely se t t led  counties; county and local off ic ials  were generally 
many miles from  the centers, and prompt handling of disciplinary cases 
would have been diff icul t ,  Prejudice and suspicion against the eva- 
cuees was prevalent; there was a strong likelihood tha t  local  l a w  en- 
forcement of f ic ia l s  would be influenced by t h i s  sentiment t o  deal more 
s t r i c t l y  w i t h  offenders among evacuees than the offences warranted. 
Whether or not this became an actuality, the  handling of a l l  offenses 
by outside agencies would have seriously hampered establishment and 
maintenance of rapport between WRA and the evacuees. More than this, 
it would have resulted in publicity out of all proportion t o  the magni- 
tude of the disciplinarg problem involved, because of the focus  of 
public attention upon the evacuees, and intensified the Authority's al- 
ready d i f f i cu l t  task of allaying public fear and gaining; acceptance 
for the program of further resettlement, Further, experience soon bore 
out the validity of the assumption that  because of the financial and 
administrative burden, coupled w i t h  the pol i t ica l  r i sks  involved, local 
o f f i c i a l s  would generally be unwilling  t o  assume  responsibility for 
minor disciplinary problems, In  the l i gh t  of these circmstances, in- 
vocation of administrative  disciplinary authority i n  lieu of reliance 
upon State l a w  enforcement for  the bulk of the offenses l ike ly  t o  be 
committed was  a practical necessity. 
Evacuee Participation in Center Government 
The obvious advantages i n  delegating administrative authority to 
the evacuee residents o v e r  considerable areas of c o m m u n i t y  a c t iv i ty  
led  to early formlat ion of procedures under which the evacuees could 
organize quasi-governmental ins t i tu t ions  w i t h  rather broad powers. 
Following an interim instruction directing each project director to 
provide for the election of temporary block representatives t o  serve 
i n  an advisory capacity, there was issued In August 1942 a rather com- 
prehensive instruction providing the f ramework  f o r  permanent evacuee 
governmental  organization. This instruction, as later amended i n  minor 
detai ls ,  required each project director to provide for  the selection 
of an evacuee organization c o m m i s s i o n  t o  prepare a "plan for community 
government," to become effective only after approval by the project 
director and by a majority of the qualified voters voting in  a special 
referendum on the question of adopting the plan, The plan was required 
t o  provide for:  
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1, Election and organization of a "representative legis lat ive 
body"t o  be known as the community council, with authority 
t o :  
(a) Prescribe regulations and provide penalties fo r  their 
violation on a l l  matters, except felonies, affecting 
the internal peace and order and the welfare of the 
evacuee residents, insofar as  not in conflict  with 
Federal or State law, mili tary proclamaticn, or WRA 
regulation, with maximum penalties not to  exceed those 
imposable by the project director under h i s  own dis- 
ciplinary powers. 
(b) Present resolutions t o  WRA on questions affecting the 
welfare of residents. 
(c) Solicit ,  receive, and administer funds and property fo r  
community purposes, 
(d) License and require reasonable license fees from eva- 
cuee-operated enterprises, upon approval. by the project 
director, but not t o  regulate their  management. 
(e) Appoint c o m m i t t e e s  t o  a s s i s t  i n  the exercise of i t s  
functions, 
( f )  Exercise such other funct ions  as might be conferred from 
time to  time by WRA. 
2. Designation of a judicial  commission of not l e s s  than three 
members t o  hear cases and fix penalties for  violation of 
councilregulations. 
3. Orderly methods of arbitration fo r  voluntary settlement of 
c i v i l  disputes between center residents, 
All elections were t o  be by secret bal lot ,  and a l l  evacuees 18 years 
of age or over were el igible  t o  vote. The r ight  to  hold elective or 
appointive office w a s  f i r s t  limited t o  American citizens, but was 
soon extended to  all persons who had not been denied leave clearance 
under the leave regulations a f te r  loyalty screening. 
The instruction further provided that  the project director could 
s e t  aside any council regulation found t o  be i n  excess of its defined 
functions, Decisions of the judicial commission, t o  be rendered a f t e r  
notice and hearing, were required t o  be communicated d i rect ly  t o  the 
project director f o r  review, The decision became f i n a l  i f  the project 
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director did not act within 24 hours; within that period the project 
director could affirm the decision or remand it for  reconsideration 
with h i s  recommendations.  upon remand the c o m m i s s i o n  was required to  
reconsider and render a decision anew, which was subject t o  similar 
review. 
The only feature of this community government framework which 
raised any legal  question was the delegation of authority t o  the com- 
munity council t o  prescribe regulations and the similar delegation of 
authority t o  the judicial  canmission t o  enforce them against the eva- 
cuees. The Supreme Court has held tha t  the due process clause invali- 
dates provisions enabling private persons to impose l imitations having  
the force of l aw  upon other persons, 7 On the other hand, the Court 
has sustained s tatutes  involving delegation of administrative  authority 
to private persons where final authority was retained by public offi- 
c i a l s  administering the  program t o  approve or veto the ru les  or orders 
privately formulated. The rules  or orders must in the last analysis 
be those of the of f ic ia l  body, 
All the ac ts  which the Director empowered the community council to  
do were acts which the Director under the control l ing  Executive order 
was himself empowered to do. While the policy called for no express 
approval by the project director or other official of each regulation 
promulgated by the council, the project director could s e t  aside any 
regulation found t o  be i n  excess of the council's powers. Even if 
fa i lure  to  s e t  aside did not amount t o  approval, review and approval 
were not necessary a t  t h i s  particular stage of the administrative 
process. Review and approval of regulations by responsible public 
o f f i c i a l s  must occur before the rules  are made f ina l ly  operative as  
against anybody, but the system set up by t h e  instruction was such 
t ha t  no regulation could be f ina l ly  enforced against any person except 
through the judicial  commission, and its decisions were reviewed by the 
project director. 
Finally, as t o  the propriety of the judicial  commission's exercise 
of the  functions assigned t o  it, l i t t l e  doubt can be raised. The hear- 
ing procedure provided f o r  under each community government plan paral- 
le led tha t  required where the project director exercised h i s  dieciplin- 
ery authority, and was sufficiently elaborate t o  sa t i s fy  requirements 
of procedural due process, No decision of the judicial commission could 
take ef fec t  u n t i l  it was submitted t o  the project director f o r  eview, 
and no such decision could go into ef fec t  if he disapproved it. If he 
7 Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
8 
Currin v, Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1930); United S t a t e s  v. Royal Rock Co- 
operative, 307 U.S. 533 (1939).  
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did not disapprove the decision, it became h i s  decision. If he did 
disapprove it, the case was remanded for  new determinat ion  by the 
judicial  commission, While it is  t rue that  the project director was 
not authorized to substitute h i s  own  determination for  that of the 
cammission, the important f ac t  was that  in no event could any decision 
of the commission become binding without h i s  approval. 
Plans of government following the pattern prescribed by the WRA 
instruction were adopted a t  a l l  but two of the centers. No plan what- 
ever was adopted a t  Manzrnar; the evacuee block managers performed the 
function of l iaison  between the project director and the center resi- 
dents. A t  Minidoka a plan of government adoptad rather l a t e  i n  the l i f e  
of the center provided only f o r  election and organization of a community 
council, with purely advisory powers, The evacuee community government 
organized a t  Tule Lake under the WRA instruction was short-lived; upon 
designation of Tule Lake as a segregation center the instruction was re- 
voked as  t o  t h a t  center and provision was made only fo r  a "representative 
committee" of segregants to  act i n  a l ia i son  and advisory capacity. 
On the whole, the functioning of the  evacuee governmental organi- 
zations proved reasonably satisfactory to a l l  concerned, though a t  
f i r s t  they sometimes operated crudely and inefficiently,  which was t o  
be expected from  a group unused t o  responsible po l i t i ca l  action. Com- 
munity councils adopted regulat ions  covering numerous topics, the most 
important paralleling the law and order regulations prescribed by WRA 
f o r  a l l  centers. None of the councils took steps toward Licensing 
evacuee enterprises and exaciting license fees; this function stemmed 
solely from the Federal regulatory power, and the  probable corollary 
t h a t  all fees  collected should be deposited i n  the  miscellaneousre- 
ceipts account of the Federal Treasury deprived the councils of the 
primary incentive for in i t i a t ing  licensing action.  Throughtout the l i fe  
of the centers, as a matter of fact-, the bulk of council a c t i v i e  lay  
outside the regulatory sphere. Primarily the councils served as media 
of communication between  the administration and the evacuees, and as 
representatives of the residents in making recommendations for  changes 
in policy and pressing  complaints of all kinds, 
The judicial  commissions i n i t i a l l y  were inclined t o  evade respon- 
s i b i l i t y  and avoidthe determination of d i f f i c u l t  cases or the imposi -  
t ion of more than suspended sentences. Occasionally it was necessary 
fo r  the project di rec tors  t o  take a c t i o n  under the i r  residuary powers. 
With the gradual growth of civicawareness and sense of responsibtl i ty 
among the evacuees and the accretion of p o l i t i c a l  and judicial  experi- 
ence, however, most of the commissions developed in to  effective enforce- 
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I n  compliance with the  W R A  instsuction,  the  plans of government 
generally provided f o r  an arbitratdon commission that  could be u t i l i z e d  
by the res idents  i n  settling private controversies. I n  a l l  of the 
Sta tes  i n  which the centers were located, there was an a rb i t ra t ion  
s t a tu t e  under which summary enforcement of an a rb i t ra t ion  award  was 
possible, and a rb i t ra t ion  procedures could e a s i l y  have been devised 
t h a t  met the varying s ta tutory requirements, A s  it developed, however, 
the a rb i t ra t ion  commissions never functioned. The evacuees simply pre- 
fe r red  t o  handle privately any disputes t h e y  may have had, In par t  
this w a s  undoubtedly a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  the typical  reluctance of the  
evacuees t o  air disputes. It is also  true,  however, t h a t  the  chief 
source of controversies in which a rb i t ra t ion  i s  customarily invoked- 
disputes arising out ofc o m m e r c i a l  transactions--was la rgely  nonexistent 
i n  the centers because of the general prohibition against evacuee pri-  
vate enterprises other than the cooperatives, 
Extra-ordinary Law and Order Measures 
For t he  usual offenses against the  peace and securi ty of the 
centers, t he  framework fo r  enforcement of discipline,  as  discussed 
above, worked out  quite sa t is factor i ly .  Administrative handling of 
minor offenses was welcomed by loca l  l a w  enforcement off icers  and there  
can he no doubt t h a t  this contributed great ly  t o  harmonious relat ion- 
ships with them. The pattern for  handling offenses in te rna l ly  corres- 
ponded closely t o  the general pat tern  tha t  obtained i n  the average 
American community and gradually gained acceptance and approval among 
the evacuees. But acceptance did not come immediately, and WRA's inter- 
nal secur i ty  regulations  proved t o  be ineffect ive  t o  cope w i t h  some 
major c r i s e s  t ha t  occurred e a r l y  i n  the program. The evacuees had been 
torn abruptly from the i r  homes, businesses and professions, t o  be con- 
fined under mi l i t a ry  guard f i r s t  in assembly and l a t e r  i n  relocation 
centers. Center l iv ing f a c i l i t i e s  were crude a t  best. I n i t i a l  c o m -  
munity disorganization and mistrust  of administrative pol ic ies  
heightened an already acute sense of insecurity. Undoubtedly all eva- 
cuees were disaffected. in some degree; m a n y ,  par t icular ly  i n  the young 
citizen  group, were embittered. I n  t h i s  abnormal and pathological 
si tuation,  grievances real  and fancied were nurtured and magnified, 
preevacuation feuds flared, and ugly rumors about camp administration 
spread likewildfire,  Hotheads and opportunists found f e r t i l e  ground 
for agitation. 
Center-wide disturbances occurred a t  Colorado River and Manzanar 
l a t e  i n  1942, Common t o  both were work stoppages and mob demonstra- 
tions; a complete b r e a k d o w n  of the s t i l l  embryonic evacuee governmental 
organizations, and outbreaks of violence and terrorism against evacuees 
who were cooperating w i t h  the administration. A t  Manzanar i t  was neces- 
sary t o  c a l l  i n  the mil i tary  contingent, ,and blood was  shed. Neither 
WRA nor loca l  author i t ies  were i n  a position t o  cope with the  problem 
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through ordinary measures, and some drast ic  surgery was  deemed necessary. 
The ringleaders a t  Manzanar were removed t o  an abandoned CCC camp a t  
Moab, Utah, and soon thereafter t o  a former Indian school at Leupp, 
Arizona, which was designated as  the "isolation center." During th is  
period the Authority issued an instruction authorizing the removal of 
"aggravated troublemakers" t o  the isolation center, a f te r  thorough 
documentation of the cases and approval by the National Director. This 
procedure was not a substitute for  disciplinary action under the al- 
ready established regulations, but was designed t o  apply to  persons 
who were responsible agents in "fomenting disorder or threatening the 
security of center residents, addicted t o  troublemaking, and beyond 
the capacity of regular processes within t he  relocation center t o  keep 
under control."
The primary purpose of the isolation procedure was preventive 
rather than punitive-to skim off the known sources of aggravated agi- 
ta t ion and c o m m u n i t y  disruption, and allow the healing processes of 
time, adjustment t o  center l i f e ,  crystall izing community organization, 
and improved methods of l ia ison between WRA and the evacuees to  operate, 
The isolation center functioned as a rehabili tation center, and i ts  in- 
habitants were gradually retransferred t o  other centers, It closed 
l a t e  in 1943 with the transfer of its remaining residents t o  T u l e  Lake, 
which had just  become the segregation center, and the isolation proce- 
dure was soon a f t e r  revoked. 
There was only one subsequent major center incident, occurring a t  
Tule Lake in November 1943 shortly a f t e r  the segregation movements had 
been completed. Here a  w e l l  k n i t  pro-Japanese faction bidding fo r  
power was responsible f o r  work stoppage, demonstrations, and a campaign 
of goon squad violence and terrorism directed against both evacuees and 
administrative personnel, Breakdown  of community inst i tut ions and 
deterioration of WRA services during the segregation movements, and 
the concentration in the center of disloyal or  more disaffected evacuees 
underlay the success of the faction. The mili tary assumed control of 
the center, a t  WRA request, and rounded up several hundred known or 
suspected agitators and active participants i n  the outbreak. One block 
of the center was fenced off and used as an isolation ward. After re- 
turn of center control t o  the Authority, intensive investigations were 
conducted as a r e su l t  of which a number of the aliens isolated  were in- 
terned by the Departanent of Justice. The r e s t  of the group were gradu- 
ally released back into the main resident ial  area as investigations 
progressed and as  center conditions stabilized. 
Private B u s i n e s s  a t  the Centers 
It was realized tha t  one of the f i r s t  needs of the evacuees i n  the 
centers would be some system of stores and shops a t  which they could 
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procure goods and services over and above the  basic essentials of sub- 
sistence otherwise furnished by the War Relocation A u t h o r i t y .  The possi- 
b i l i t y  of operating Government stores, l i k e  Army canteens, was considered 
and rejected, Instead, regulations were issued authorizing the evacuees 
t o  own and operate the i r  own business enterprises, on a cooperative 
basis, in Government buildings for  which they would pay a  f a i r  rental. 
These regulations limited t o  someextentthe type of goods and services 
t o  be sold, required employment of personnel a t  WRA wage scales, l a id  
down general rules  covering organization, management practices, and 
accounting procedures, provided for periodic WRA audit, and forbade the 
operation of any other types of private business enterprises. 
The form of organization contemplated for  the business enterprises 
a t  the centers was that of the consumers cooperative association, 
organized on Rochdale principles and incorporated under appropriate 
existent laws. This form of organization would assure t o  a l l  the eva- 
cuees an opportunity to have a participating in teres t  in the enter- 
prises, avoid unfair prof i t  to some a t  the expense of others, and pro- 
vide limited l iab i l i ty .  Since the need for  s t o re s  was immediate when 
the centers were opened, and could not await the legal processes of in- 
corporation and authorization t o  do business, trusteeships were estab- 
l ished and began operations on credit  or small amounts of borrowed 
money. In a typical t r u s t  instrument, the trustees declared that  the 
property and business were held by them i n  t r u s t  for the cooperative 
corporation thereafter to be formed a t  the center, t o  which f u l l  con- 
veyance would be promptly made as soon as organization of the corpora- 
t ion  should be completed. The instrument further provided f o r  manage- 
ment and control by persons approved by the project director in  accord- 
ance w i t h  the regulations of the Authority, w i t h  periodic audit, 
While the business enterprise; a t  three of the centers were in- 
corporated under the l a w  of the States  i n  which they were doing busi- 
ness, the laws of some of the States were not suitable for  organization 
of consumers cooperatives. With one exception corporations t o  operate 
i n  these States were organized under the D i s t r i c t  of Columbia Coopera- 
t ive  Association Act, w i t h  subsequent qualification t o  do business a s  
foreign corporations i n  the States where the centers were located. 
Since authorization t o  a foreign corporation t o  do business in a State 
is  normally l i t t l e  more than a formality, assuring compliance with laws 
concerning appointment of an agent for  service of process, payment of 
specified fees  a n d  fulfillment of similar technical requirements, no 
d i f f icu l ty  was  anticipated, and none occured except i n  the State of 
Arizona, There a license issued t o  the G i l a  River Cooperative Enter- 
prises, Inc., which was incorporated i n  the D i s t r i c t  of Colmnbia, was 
cancelled by the Arizona Corporation Commission, The principal reason 
advanced for  the cancellation a t  a subsequent public hearing was the 
possibi l i ty  tha t  the corporation, which under i ts  charter could engage 
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in agricultural  and commercial enterprises, might be able t o  dominate 
Arizona agriculture and commerce, Though it was pointed out that  this 
was not under the Arizona law a ground far excluding the corporation, 
and tha t  there was actually no more danger of this happening than w i t h  
any other corporation whose a r t i c l e s  did not narrowly l i m i t  i ts  acti- 
v i t ies ,  the matter was eventually compromised by amenamg the a r t i c l e s  
t o  r e s t r i c t  the corporation's business ac t iv i t i e s  to the Gila River Re- 
location Center. 
Approximately one-third of the evacuees were Japanese nationals 
subject t o  foreign funds control regulations of the Treasury Department. 
The term "national" was defined t o  include an organization controlled 
by or a substantial part  of whose securi t ies  was owned or controlled by 
nationals, and the determination of what constitutes control lay w i t h i n  
the discretion of the Treasury Department. General License No. 68-A 
granted a general license t o  (1) Japanese nationals residing i n  the con- 
t inenta l  United States continually since June 17, 1940, and (2)  organi- 
zations within the continental United States that  were Japanese na- 
t ionals solely by r e  son of the in te res ts  therein of persons generally 
licensed under (1). It was quite improbable tha t  any business enter- 
prises could f a i l  t o  qualify under the general license. The vast major- 
i t y  of the center residents were ei ther  unblocked ci t izens or aliens who 
had been i n  this country continually since June 17, 1940, and whose 
funds were not specially blocked, Nevertheless, the mere possibi l i ty  of 
effective control of management of the enterprises by blocked nationals 
who were not generally licensed, plus the f ac t  that  the enterprises 
would necessarily se l l ,  and pay patronage dividends, t o  unlicensed 
blocked nationals as well as t o  the remainder of the center populations, 
prompted applications f o r  special licenses, A special license was 
issued by the Foreign Funds Control Unit to each of the enterprises. 
Each license authorized the cooperative or t r u s t  t o  engage  in business 
within the center as a generally licensed national and permitted trans- 
actions with and payments t o  blocked nationals i n  the center, The prin- 
c ipal  conditions imposed were that  (1) no blocked national should be an 
officer or director of the organization, and (2) records of the period- 
i c  WRA audits should be furnished to  the appropriate Federal Reserve 
Bank, 
A l l  the business enterprises undertook to comply with relevant 
State and Federal laws, to the same extent as  would other business con- 
cerns similarly situated, thus paying sales  taxes and admissions taxes 
and obeying a l l  other laws i n  so f a r  a s  they were relevant. A ruling of 
exemption from Federal income  t ax  was issued by the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue l a t e  i n  the program. 
9 See Treasury Department,  Documents Relating to Foreign Funds Control 
(1945)
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PART III 
STRUCTURE  AND FUNCTIONS OF THE WRA LEGAL ORGANIZATION  
Organization 
During most of 1942 the  l ega l  work of the Authority was  performed 
a t  three d i f fe ren t  levels-Washington, the  regional offices,  and the 
relocation centers, The Office of the So l i c i t o r  in Washington was, of 
course, responsible f o r  all l ega l  services throughout the Authority, 
A regional at torney (P-6) a t  each of the regional off ices  (Denver, 
L i t t l e  Rock, and San Francisco) was d i r e c t l y  i n  charge of a l l  legal  
work a r i s ing  a t  the regional o f f ice  and w a s  responsible f o r  a l l  such 
work ar is ing a t  the  relocation centers  within the  region. A project  
attorney (P-5) was immediately responsible, under the  supervision of 
the regional  attorney, f o r  t he  performance of all l ega l  work a r i s ing  
a t  the  center, The reorganization of the Authority in December 1942 
abolished t he  regional off ices  and thereafter  the  work of t he  project  
attorneys was d i r ec t l y  under the supervision of the Solicitor. The 
reorganization l e f t  i n  San f iancisco an evacuee property division and 
A s s i s t a n t  Director, both serving in a s t a f f  c a p a c i t y .  These were 
serviced by a l ega l  o f f ice  headed by a principal  attorney (P-6, l a t e r  
ass i s tan t  so l ic i to r ,  P-7) and operating as a branch of the So l ic i to r ' s  
Washington office. 
The l e g a l  organization-the Washington off ice ,  the s t a f f  off ice  i n  
San Francisco, and the  project  attorney offices-remained unaltered 
during the remainder of the program, No attorney w a s  assigned t o  t h e  
Emergency Refugee Shelter, which became the  responsibi l i ty  of the  
Authority i n  July 1944; instead t he  Washington off ice  furnished d i r ec t l y  
a l l  l ega l  services required by the  Shelter  s t a f f  and i t s  residents. 
Two area attorney posit ions (P-5) were, however, created in the summer 
of  1945 at  Seat t le  and Los Angeles, t he  headquarters of two of the  
three West Coast a rea  offices established following the  lifting of the  
military exclusion orders t o  a s s i s t  returning evacuees. The area 
attorneys, under the supervision of the Sol ic i tor ,  handled a l l  the 
l ega l  work arising a t  these area offices. The So l ic i to r ' s  staff of f ice  
in San Francisco, which previously had been responsible f o r  the l ega l  
work of a l l  three area offices, continued to  perform those services f o r  
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The Work of the Washington Office 
Constitutional Issues and the Leave Program 
A discussion of the constitutional issues inherent i n  the evacua- 
t ion and exclusion orders and i n  the subsequent relocation program of 
the Authority is s e t  for th in Part  I,   The Solicitor's office worked 
closely with the Department of Justice i n  the preparation of the 
Government's br ie fs  i n  the t e s t  cases tha t  arose, from their inst i tu-  
t ion i n  the Federal Distr ic t  Courts to  the i r  final disposition by the  
United States  Supreme Court, In connection w i t h  the Endo case, the 
office prepared an exhaustive memorandum on the v a l i d i t y  o f  detention 
under the leave regulations, copies of which were made available t o  the 
Department of Justice and others affected by or interested i n  the re- 
location program, 
The S o l i c i t o r ' s   office played a large part  in the actual drafting 
of the leave regulations, the detailed handbook provisions and forms 
that  implemented them, and the many modifications i n  the leave program 
tha t  were made from time t o  time, In tha t  phase of the leave program 
which involved screening of the evacuees, the office assisted in 
developing the c r i t e r i a  to be applied and the procedures for  conducting 
hearings in doubtful cases, and in  training Washington reviewers of the 
dockets, Every d o c k e t  which raised doubt about the individual's e l i -  
g ib i l i ty  for clearance was further reviewed i n  the Sol ici tor 's  office 
prior t o  consideration by the Director; t h i s  required the examination 
of same 1,500 dockets and constituted a large portion of the office's 
work load during 1943 and the early months of 1944. After the estab- 
lishment of an appeal procedure f o r  segregants a t  the Tule Lake center 
who had been denied clearance, the office was made primarily responsible 
for  set t ing up a panel of prominent c ivi l ians wil l ing t o  serve on the 
appeal board, for  establishing procedures t o  f ac i l i t a t e  the board's 
work, and f o r  calling i t s  meetings. 1 
Field Operations
The problems of center administration tha t  required legal  research 
ranged wide i n  content and complexity. One basic cluster  revolved 
around the extent t o  which exclusive Federal jurisdiction had been ob- 
tained over the various center s i tes ,  and the degree t o  which center 
operations were subject t o  State regulatory laws. Another concerned 
1 
The board m e t  once a t  Tule Lake i n  August 1944 ,  disposing of a l l  
appeals then pending; repeal of the leave regulations a t  the end of 
the year obviated the need fo r  further sessions.. -
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the agency's authority t o  establish i t s  own disciplinary procedures 
for the handling of center l a w  and order problems, and t o  delegate 
certain quasi-gavermnental functions t o  the evacuee residents. A ser ies  
of opinions analyzed the arbitration l a w s  of the States i n  which centers 
were located, preliminary t o  the drafting of procedures t o  f a c i l i t a t e  
arbitration of private disputes between center residents. 2 
State laws governing registration of b i r ths  and deaths, and the 
disposition of deceased remains, were summarized for the information of 
center off ic ials ;  WRA's authority t o  establish cemeteries a t  the various 
centers was determined; a procedure was evolved fo r  the disposal of 
the effects  of evacuees dying in the centers without known heirs, 
WRA's basic authority t o  provide for  the needs of the evacuees was con- 
strued i n  opinions concluding tha t  WRA could admit for center residence 
the nonevacuee or Caucasian family members af evacuees, issue clothing 
to evacuees, provide financial  assistance t o  evacuee college students, 
and pay malpractice insurance premiums for  center-employed evacuee 
physicians. The applicabili ty of Federal Indian liquor laws a t  the 
Arizona centers and of the Federal meat inspection act  t o  intercenter 
shipments of center-produced meat w a s  determined, A substantial saving 
t o  WRA appropriations resulted from a conclusion that  land grant ra tes  
were applicable to WRA shipment  centers of Government equipent  and 
supplies required for basic needs of the evacuees. 3 The propriety of 
WRA disposition of unclaimed evacuee property i n  i ts  custody a t  the 
close of the program was a question resolved affirmatively, and alter-  
native procedures covering sale  a t  public auction or transfer of the 
property t o  evacuee organizations for  continued custody were drafted, 
Among miscellaneous questions treated by formal opinion  were WRA's 
authority t o  lease surplus center land t o  private persons, the appoint- 
ment of center internal  security officers as deputy marshals and deputy 
sheriffs,  the bonding of employees handling evacuee property matters, 
the l i a b i l i t y  of WRA and i t s  employees for center f i r e  losses, the use 
of center f i r e  equipment on adjacent private lands, applicabili ty of 
dual compensation laws i n  the employment of WRA personnel t o  teach 
vocational training classes subsidized by State-Federal funds, and the 
detemination of charges t o  be made against center administrative  
personnel f o r  WRA-furnished subsistence. 
2 
For discussion of Federal-State Jurisdict ion ,  center government, and 
arbi t rat ion see Part  II. 
3 This conclusion, i n  which the Comptro l le r  General concurred, i s  now 
the subject of l i t i ga t ion  i n  the Court of Claims. 
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Assistance t o  Center Cooperatives 
Following the decision t o  permit establishment of evacuee-operated 
cooperative organizations i n  the centers t o  supply goods and services 
beyond the subsistence d i r ec t l y  furnished by WRA, the off ice  prepared 
the necessary  organization papers, issued ins t ruct ions  and opinions to 
guide the project  attorneys in completing organization and resolving 
i n i t i a l  questions of t ax  l i a b i l i t y  and compliance with Sta te  law,  
drafted r en t a l  agreements fo r  the enterprises '  use of WRA buildings and 
equipment, and negotiated the  issuance of a Treasury Department l icense 
t o  each organization. Late in 1943 an agreement w a s  drafted, i n  colla- 
boration with evacuees representing the cooperatives, under which the 
cooperatives established a centra l  purchasing off ice  i n  N e w  York City 
to  meet the growing consumer goods shortage. I n  the spring of 1945, 
anticipating the ear ly  l iquidation of the cooperatives, the off ice  
prepared a comprenensive summary of  the steps necessary for dissolution  
and d i s t r ibu t ion  of assets,  a n d  sen t  an attorney t o  an all-center con- 
ference of cooperative representatives t o  discuss dissolution problems. 
Problems of the Evacuees 
A great  deal  of the  work of the  Washington off ice  consisted i n  the 
preparation of opinions, memoranda, or informational manual re leases  
primarily fo r  the guidance of the project  attorneys and other f i e l d  
personnel i n  ass i s t ing  evacuees with t h e i r  personal problems. Among 
the subjects covered were the voting r i gh t s  of the  evacuees i n  t he  
evacuated States; the i r  income tax l i a b i l i t y  with respect  t o  wages 
subsistence received from WRA; t h e i r  e l i g i b i l i t y  for unemployment com- 
pensation, old age and survivors insurance, and ra i l road retirement 
benefi ts;  t he  f i l i n g  of claims with the United Sta tes  Employees  Compen- 
sat ion C o m m i s s i o n  f o r  injury t o  e v a c u e e s  employed i n  the centers by 
WRA;  applicable Sta te  l a w s  governing adoption of evacuee orphans; 
va l i d i t y  of comon l a w  marriages in the  evacuated States;  the probate 
of e s t a t e s  of evacuees dying in relocation centers; S ta te  jur isdic t ion 
over evacuees for  divorce purposes; Selective Service requirements, and 
reemployment benef i ts  under t he  Selective Service Act; a l i en  enemy 
control  regulations with respect  t o  t r ave l  and contraband; foreign funds 
control  r e s t r i c t i ons  and procedures for l icensing blocked nationals; 
the  acquisi t ion and termination of Japanese ci t izenship by American- 
born evacuees ( the  so-called "dual citizenship" problem); and the  pro- 
vis ions  of our nat ional i ty  laws governing naturalization and expatria- 
tion. The reactivation of a l i en  land law enforcement on the West Coast 
against  evacuees resul ted in a se r ies  a f  opinions  analyzing these laws 
and c o u r t  decisions in terpret ing them. Memoranda were a lso  issued 
discussing the const i tu t ional i ty  of discriminatory l eg i s la t ion  pro- 
posed or enacted a f t e r  the evacuation i n  the various Sta tes  in which the 
relocation centers  were located, including the Arizona law prohibiting 
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business transactions with evacuees p r io r  t o  public notice ( l a t e r  held 
unconstitutional by the Arizona Supreme Court), the Arkansas law pro- 
hibi t ing land ownership by persons of Japanese ancestry (declared un- 
const i tu t ional  by the  S ta te  attorney general),  the  Wyoming and Utah laws 
prohibiting land ownership by ine l ig ib le  al iens,  and the  ca l i fornia  and 
Wyoming laws aimed a t  denying fishing l icenses t o  evacuees. For t h e  
benef i t  of evacuees thinking of r e se t t l i ng  outside the evacuated area, 
the o f f ice  prepared summaries of the l a w s  of the various Sta tes  with 
respect t o  a l ien  land o w n e r s h i p  and the  licensing of a l iens  t o  enter 
cer ta in  occupations and professions. The o u t c r o p p i n g  of violence, in- 
timidation, and economic discrimination on the West Coast against re- 
turning evacuees i n  the spring of 1945 prompted the  issuance of opinions 
discussing the protection afforded the evacuees by Federal and Sta te  
c i v i l  r i gh t s  s ta tu tes ,  the l ega l i ty  of various types of boycotts, and 
the use of the mails to  discourage the  re turn of evacuees. Two comon 
problems  of returning evacuees i n  dispossessing t he i r  tenants were 
t rea ted  in an opinion on the legal e f f ec t  of leases "for the d u r a t i m  
of the war"  and a summary of OPA requirements governing eviction. 
Despite  the  scope and volume of l ega l  material  prepared for f i e l d  
use i n  ass is t ing evacuees, awide  var ie ty  of individual problems were 
referred t o  Washington from the  f i e l d  and found t he i r  way t o  the  
So l i c i t o r l s  off ice  fo r  handling, Some of them came from relocated 
evacuees whoneeded lega l  assistance , and included many of the types 
of problems handled by the project  attorneys for  center residents (see 
below). A small number came from refugees a t  the Emergency  Refugee 
Shelter, a t  which there was no regularly assigned attorney, Others 
were matters i n  which i n i t i a l  assistance had been given by f i e l d  a t tor-  
neys, but which required e i ther  fur ther  research or expedition a t  the  
Washington level ,  The l a t t e r  included questions of immigration s ta tus ,  
t ax  l i a b i l i t y ,  foreign funds control  licensing, permits f o r  t rave l  into 
r e s t r i c t ed  areas, parole of interned al iens,  and similar matters which 
required contact with various Federal agencies. 
A large p a r t  of the time of the Sol ic i tor ,  and t o  a lesse r  extent 
of the ass i s tan t  so l i c i t o r s ,  was spent i n  consultation with the D i -  
rec tor  and with other d i v i s i o n  chiefs on the development and modifica- 
t ion  of major policies. (Often  t h i s  took the form of service on special  
committees designated by the Director t o  formulate proposed p o l i c y  
statements and procedures, and the Sol ic i tor  was often cal led upon i n i -  
t i a l l y  t o  d r a f t  commi t t ee  recommendations.) One such major policy, 
already discussed above, was the Authority's program t o  encourage and 
f a c i l i t a t e  t he  resettlement of evacuees throughout the country, which 
had as  its concomitant the leave regulations. After the Manzanar and 
Poston incidents l a t e  i n  1942, the Sol ic i to r  submitted a comprehensive 
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memorandum analyzing the  center law and order problem; t h i s  formed the  
basis  for policy discussions and administrative decisions resul t ing i n  
the preparation by the  So l i c i t o r ' s  off ice  of the deta i led in te rna l  se- 
cur i ty  regulations defining the project  d i rectors '  d isc ipl inary author- 
i t y ,  punishable affenses, and the procedure for a r r e s t  and trial, A t  
t h i s  time the  procedure  governing i so la t ion  of pers is tent  troublemakers 
w a s  a l so  drafted. The Sol ic i tor  w a s  a member of the c o m m i t t e e  estab- 
l ished by t h i s  procedure t o  review center recommendations f o r  intern- 
ment  of a l i ens  by the Department of Jus t ice  and the i so la t ion  of c i t i -  
zen troublemakers, In  connection with h i s  par t ic ipat ion i n  the  work 
of various special  committees appointed by the Director t o  recomnend 
o r  implement policy decisions, the Sol ic i tor  was responsible for the 
initial draft ing of other m a j o r  policy documents, including the  regula- 
t ions  governing the segregation of presumptively disloyal evacuees at 
Tule Lake, the special  pol ic ies  governing the administration of the 
segregation center, t h e  general procedures governing center closure, 
recommendations t o  the War Departnent with respect t o  t h e  l i f t i n g  of 
the West Coast exclusion orders, and the comprehensive statement of 
the program for accelerated resettlement of the evacuees and liquida- 
t ion  of the agency t h a t  was issued a t  the time of the l i f t i n g  of the 
exclusion orders. 
Many aspects of WRA program developnent required negotiation with 
other Federal agencies, i n  which the  Sol ic i tor ' s off ice  was cal led upon 
t o  participate. The following a re  merely i l l u s t r a t i ve ,  The ea r ly  days 
of t he  program saw negotiations with the  Department of Agriculture and 
the Department of the In te r io r  fo r  the use of lands under t h e i r  juris- 
d ic t ion as center s i t es ;  with the  W a r  Department on respective responsi- 
b i l i t i e s  i n  t he  physical aspects of evacuation, the  construction of the 
centers, and the exterior guarding of the  centers; and with t he  Depart- 
ment of Jus t ice  t o  adapt enemy al ien  t ravel  regulations t o  the  WRA 
relocation program. The seasonal agr icul tura l  leave policy was worked 
out with the  Department of Agriculture. Proposals to counteract dis- 
crimination against evacuees and violat ion of t he i r  c i v i l  r i gh t s  were 
taken up with the Departaent of Justice. The establishment of the 
emergency Refugee Shelter required negotiations with the  War Depart- 
ment covering securi ty precautions and WRA's  use of Fort Ontario and 
Army equipment; w i t h  the Treasury Departnent f o r  the unblocking of 
refugee funds; and with Immigration and Selective Service author i t ies  
concerning a l ien and Selective Service reg i s t ra t ion  of the refugees. 
Proposals f o r  permitting the refugees t o  leave the Shelter under 
sponsorship were discussed with representatives of the  Justice and 
Sta te  Departments, a s  was a l a t e r  a l ternat ive  t o  process them f o r  ad- 
mission under t he  immigration laws. Extended preliminary meetings were 
held with the  War and Just ice  Departments regarding the l i f t i n g  of the 
4 See Part  II. 
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West Coast mil i tary exclusion orders and the respective postexclusion 
responsibil i t ies of the agencies, To meet problems arising during the 
l a s t  year of center operations, arrangements were made with the Treasury 
Department for  a simplif ied  licensing procedure applicable t o  a l ien eva- 
cuees i n  the centers, and with the Federal Public Housing Administration 
f o r  the operation of temparary WRA housing projects on the West Coast. 
Often the correspondence and d ra f t  agreements emanating from these vari- 
ous discussions were prepared initially i n  the Solicitor 's  office, 
The Director ear ly established a rule tha t  all proposed policy 
statements, regulations, procedures, and forms (in addition t o  memoranda 
of understanding, contracts and other legal instruments, informational 
documents concerning WRA's basic authority, and correspondence involving 
lega l  problems) should be cleared i n  advance with the Solicitor. The 
review of these docments was  a service rather than a control function, 
and responsibility for  obtaining legal  r ev iew  rested with the in i t ia t ing  
or issuing official. By and large, however, a l l  such documents were 
clearedwith the Solicitor 's  office. This meant tha t  the office was kept 
currently informed on all administrative problems and recommended poli- 
c ies  and procedures. In practice it also meant tha t  the services of 
the off ice were generally sought, in advance of preparation of program 
documents in  f ina l  form, for  assistance in actual drafting, as well as  
in the resolution of legal. problems and in  undertaking any necessary 
preliminary negotiations with other agencies. W i t h  theconstant flow
of administrative instructions t o  the f ie ld ,  t h i s  drafting assistance 
bulked large in  the work load of the office, 
 Miscellaneous  
Throughout the pogram numerous f i s c a l  and p e r s o n n a l  problems were 
referred t o  the Sol ic i tor t s  office f o r  opinion or for  preparation of 
submissions t o  the Comptroller General. Some of these have already 
been discussed above. Various types of contracts, lease agreements, 
use permits, and other legal instruments were prepared, Claims f i l e d  
against the Authority were reviewed for sufficiency, and the off ice  
participated i n  negotiations t o  s e t t l e  controversies  arising out of 
various contracts and memoranda of understanding, A member of the 
office served on the agency property survey board. The office was 
responsible for  analyzing and keeping the Director  currently informed 
about all l i t igat ion,  court decisions,  and pruposed State and Federal 
legislation affecting the agency or the evacuees, and was generally 
assigned the task of writing reports requested by congressional com- 
mittees on pending b i l l s ,  In the f i e l d  of legis lat ive drafting the 
off ice collabarated i n  the preparation of the annual appropriation 
items, and l a t e  in the program drafted an evacuation claims b i l l  tha t  
was introduced  in Congress a t  the request of the Department of the 
I n t e r i o r  (S. 2127, 79th Congress). 
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Supervision over Field Attorneys 
Obviously the tempo of the program and the range and novelty of 
i t s  legal problems pointed t o  the need fo r  coordination and uniformity 
of approach a t  a l l  levels, The chief supervisory control was a system 
of weekly communications between the Solicitor and each f i e ld  attorney. 
Each f i e l d  attorney transmitted t o  the Solicitor a weekly report i n  the 
form of a personal narrative l e t t e r ,  together with copies of all written 
material prepared i n  the f i e l d  attorney's office during the week. A 
copy of the report i t s e l f  was at the same time sent to  each other f i e l d  
attorney, This  report  gave a resume of the attorney's ac t iv i t i e s  during 
the week. New problems arising and the attorney's approach t o  them 
were outlined; the Sol ici tor 's  assistance was requested where the prob- 
lem w a s  one required t o  be handled a t  the Washington level  (see below), 
where research beyond the attorney's time or library f a c i l i t i e s  was , 
necessary, or where expedition a t  the Washington level was advisable, 
Significant news items of general interest  were mentioned. Comments on 
problems raised by other f i e ld  attorneys and observations on the 
effectiveness of administrative policies were often included. In the
case s f  the project attorneys, major developments i n  those phases of 
center administration i n  which the attorney played a particularly im- 
portant role-disciplinary action, community goverment, operation of 
the business enterprises, leave clearance investigations, l ia ison w i t h  
local  public and private agencies-ere discussed and analyzed. The 
Solicitor replied to  each weekly report ,  answering questions raised, 
supplying relevant information, indicating any disagreement i n  legal 
judgment or with action taken, and making any other appropriate com- 
ments. 5  A copy of t h i s  reply likewise went t o  each other f i e l d  attor- 
ney. Responsibility for  preparing these repl ies  was divided b e t w e e n  
two of the Sol ici tor 's  chief assistants. 
The weekly report system provided a broad, frequent, two way 
channel of communication t ha t  insured adequate supervision, a high 
degree of coordination, and a basis for  judgjng the attorneys' under- 
standing of program objectives and the i r  effectiveness in working with 
t h e i r  respective administrative organizations. There were other de- 
sirable end results,  F ie ld -wide  distribution of the report corres- 
pondence acquainted every f i e l d  attorney with the nature and disposi- 
t ion  of the problems of a l l  the others, increasing operating effi-  
ciency, The reports often gave a perspective of f i e l d  problems and 
developments t ha t  was of considerable benefit to key adminis t ra t ive  
personnel i n  the Washington office, to whom significant excerpts from 
the reports were regularly made available. Not the l eas t  value of the 
5 During the existence of the regional offices the regional attorneys 
received the weekly reports of the project attorneys and prepared the 
repl ies  . 
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system was the s p i r i t  of camaraderie tha t  it helped develop and maintain 
throughout the entire  l ega l  organization, 
Every f i e l d  attorney was authorized t o  issue legal  opinions and 
memoranda on problems arising a t  h i s  level,  subject t o  the qualifica- 
t ion tha t  problems which affected basic over-all policy formulation, 
or which equally concerned a l l  centers o r  regions, were required t o  be 
referred t o  the Solicitor. Further t o  preclude duplication of effor t ,  
a l l  requests for legal opinions involving extensive research were re- 
quired t o  be reported currently t o  the Solicitor. A s  w i l l  be noted 
la te r ,  the regional attorneys and the s ta f f  office in San Francisco 
issued a wide variety of opinions and legal memoranda. Due t o  inade- 
quate research f a c i l i t i e s  and the volume of other work, however, the 
project attorneys generally referred to  the supervising office all 
assignments that  involved research of any consequence, whether local 
i n  scope or otherwise, 
Recruitment 
Like all other Federal agencies during the w a r ,  WRA confronted a 
problem in attorney turn-over, Of 23 attcrneys originally recruited 
to  f i l l  Washington and f i e l d  positions, 7 had (by the spring of 1945) 
entered the armed farces and 11 had transferred to  more lucrative or 
more permanent employment in Government, law teaching, or  private prac- 
tice. S ix  replacements also f a i l ed  t o  remain with WRA u n t i l  the i r  ser- 
vices were no longer needed. A t  only one center did the original 
project attorney remain throughout. A t  the other centers the lega l  
positions were occupied by from 2 to 7 attorneys during the respective 
periods of center operation. This turn-over often l e f t  centers without 
regularly assigned a t torneys  for several months a t  a time, and it was 
necessary to de ta i l  attorneys from the Washington or San Francisco 
office, or divide one project attorney's time between t w o  centers, i n  
order t o  provide minimum service. 
Recruitment, particularly for f i e ld  positions, w a s  no easy task, 
The demand for capable attorneys throughout the Government far exceeded 
the supply. Many men interviewed were subject t o  ear ly Selective Ser- 
vice call. Others were reluctant to  accept work of limited duration, 
or t o  move with their families t o  the isolation and comparatively 
primitive surroundings of relocation centers. Then, too, many inter- 
ested applicants did not have suitable l ega l  experience or personal 
qualifications, It was highly important, especially in the project 
attorney positions where the bulk of the replacement problem lay, that  
the attorneys should have not only wide legal  experience and mature 
judgment but emoti onal s tabi l i ty ,  impartial a t t i tudes toward the 
minority race involved, and ab i l i t y  t o  work closely and effectively wi th  
other people i n  an administrative organization, Personality ty  was as  im- 
portant as  lega l  ability. 
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Although the recommendations of administrative personnel were wel- 
comed, the burden of attorney recruitment fo r  a l l  positions f e l l  upon 
the Solicitor. Board of Legal Examiner lists were combed; other Federal 
agencies were contacted; WRA attorneys were urged t o  make recommendations; 
advertisements were placed in State  bar journals; local  leaders of bench 
and bar were consulted; veterans placement agencies were utilized. For- 
tunately it was possible, through strenuous recruitment ac t iv i t ies  and 
interoff ice shif ts ,  t o  provide adequate lega l  services a t  all levels  
u n t i l  the very end of the program. 
Each new attorney, no matter where assigned, was detailed initi- 
ally t o  the Washington office far a 2-week period of orientation and 
training. During th i s  period he was given reading material which in- 
cluded organization charts, the administrative manual, the handbooks, 
certain administrative notices, all WRA Solici tor ls  opinions, briefs, 
and important legal memoranda, instructions to  f i e l d  attorneys, rele- 
vant regulations of other Federal agencies, and selected documents 
enabling a newcomer t o  see the program i n  his tor ical  perspective. A s  
a second step he was assigned t o  various lawyers in the office for a 
general discussion of the major clusters of problems w i t h  which the 
Solicitor 's office. had to deal, These included such topics as the  
leave regulations and the constitutional issues raised, the community 
government framework, business enterprise problems, center internal  
security policy and procedures ,  State-Federal jurisdiction, the evacuee 
property program, and Government f i s c a l  law. In connection with t h i s  
part  of the training, the Solicitor talked to the new appointee about 
the ro le  of the Lawyer i n  Government administration and gave him speci- 
f i c  suggestions on establishment and maintenance of relationships with 
administrative personnel w i t h  whom he was t o  work. 
The th i rd  step i n  the i n i t i a l  training program consisted of inter- 
views arranged for the trainee with the principal administrative s taff  
members of the Washington office, who were asked t o  discuss the i r  own 
work and problems in some detail, with special reference t o  the center 
or f i e l d  office t o  which the attorney had been assigned. With th i s  
introduction to  the work of the agency the lawyer was able t o  step into 
h is  job w i t h  a "feel" f o r  the program a n da knowledge of i t s  legal  
specialt ies tha t  made fo r  quick adjustment and maximum efficiency in 
operation. . 
The rapid development and reorientation of major policies, and the 
volume and variety of legal questions constantly arising, made con- 
tinuous on-the-job training essential. A number of devices were u t i l -  
ized to  t h i s  end. The weekly report system, described elsewhere i n  this 
report, naturally functioned as a training tool as well as a super- 
v i s o r y  control. A ser ies  of special memoranda to  f i e l d  attorneys kept 
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them abreast of organizational changes; explained the background for
m a j o r  policy documents; discussed proposed and newly enacted State and 
Federal legislation and the progress of l i t i ga t ion  of in te res t  t o  WRA 
or  the evacuees; called attention t o  and analyzed current rulings, 
orders, and changes in regulations of the Treasury, W a r ,  and Justice 
Departments, the Comptroller General, State  attarneys general, and other 
Federal and State agencies, t h a t  concerned WRA administration or affect- 
ed some or all of the evacuees; and interpreted WRA regulations, ela- 
borated upon legal rationales, and summarized regulations or procedures 
of other Federal agencies w h e r e  t he  weekly reports or special inquiries 
indicated some confusion or misunderstanding i n  the f i e l d  The 
Washington offlce also saw t o  it tha t  the f i e l d  attorneys received 
copies of br ie fs  and court decisions, l a w  review ar t ic les ,  special 
agency reports and tentative program documents, and legal memoranda 
not issued as formal, opinions---in addition t o  the mimeographed opin- 
ions, manual- and handbook releases, and administrative  notices tha t  re- 
ceived wide distribution within the agency. 
anaad 
Supplementing the f low  of written material  to  the f i e l d  was a 
policy call ing f o r  periodic personal contact with the Washington office 
or its chief staff members, A budget was established f o r  the d e t a i l  t o  
Washington of each f i e l d  attorney, in rotation, for  a 2-week  period 
each year, Sufficient advance notice was given so that he could col lect  
special problems and formulate questions  f o r  discussion in Washington. 
During his d e t a i l  Washington s ta f f  members discussed with him the de- 
tails of his work and provided any necessary criticism or advice. Dur- 
i n g  the course of the year, too, plans called for a swing around the 
f i e l d  offices by t h e  Solicitor  or his staff  members immediately respon- 
aible for  f i e l d  supervision, to observe operational efficiency and 
s ta f f  relationships, discuss current work, and answer any questions 
tha t  might be bothering the attorneys. A th i rd  and exceedingly valu- 
able means of supplementing written communication was the f i e l d  con- 
ference, attended by a l l  f i e l d  attorneys, the Solicitor,  and the 
assis tant  solicitors.  Agenda were prepared i n  advance for  these con- 
ferences on the basis of suggestions sol ic i ted from  all attorneys, 
The plans for  f i e l d  attorney de ta i l s  t o  Washington and frequent 
f i e l d  inspection tours were quite effectively real ised during the 
f i r s t  2 years of the program, but thereafter attorney turn-over in 
Washington and the  f i e l d  prevented continuance of the Washington de- 
tails and severely curtailed the number of f i e l d  inspection trips. 
One f i e l d  conferenoe was held a t  Denver in mid 1943 and another at 
San Francisco i n  early 1944. A third, planned for 1945 i n  Washington, 
was not called because of the increased load upon f i e ld  attorneys  re- 
sulting from WRA's decision to close the centers by the end of the 
year. Although it is t o  be regretted tha t  these training tools could 
not be u t i l ized  t o  f u l l  advantage during the later stages of the 
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program, it is also true t ha t  the need f o r  the i r  use declined as the 
major administrative and l e g a l  p r o b l e m s  arising out of the program were 
brought to l i g h t  and deal t  w i t h  and as f i e l d  office work became bet ter  
understood. 
The Work of the Regional Attorneys 
The f i r s t  regional office was  established in San Francisco shortly 
a f t e r  the creation of the War Relocation Authority. The region com- 
prised the West Coast States and the western t i e r  of the Inter-Mountain 
States--the s i t e s  of 6 of the 10 relocation centers that  were ultimately 
established. Later, a f te r  i t  w a s  determined t o  establish centers i n  
Arkansas, Colorado, and W y o m i n g ,  a regional office was s e t  up in 
Denver (central  region) and another in Li t t l e  Rock (southern region). 
The Pacific Coast region was the hub of operations d u r i n g  the 
early months, and assumed much of the burden of working out the divi- 
sion of responsibility with the Western Defense Command, the location 
of center sites, the beginning of construction, and the formulation 
of tentative policies for center administration and evacuee property 
managanent assistance. The first centers t o  be occupied by evacuees 
were also in the Pacific Coast region, A s  a resu l t  the work load of 
the San Francisco regional at torney  was considerably greater than tha t  
of the other regional attorneys. 6  Fifty-one formal opinions were 
issued by the San Francisco regional attorney between April and Novem- 
ber 1942; these covered a wide range of operational problems. The 
regional attorney was also given the responsibility of preparing a 
number of opinions for the Sol ici tor 's  signature and conducted con- 
siderable preliminary research into more pressing matters of State- 
Federal jurisdiction, In matters involving l ia ison with the Western 
Defense Command, the regional attorney participated i n  negotiations 
covering military orders res t r ic t ing  the movement of evacuees, the 
transfer of the Manzanar center to WRA, the functions of m i l i t a r y  
police guarding the centers, WRA custody of Army-seized evacuee con- 
traband, and WRA assi-stance t o  non-Japanese persons  individually ex- 
cluded from the West Coast by the War Department. Memoranda of under- 
standing w i t h  State boards of education with respect t o  the  educa- 
tional standards to  be adopted in the operatton of center schools w e r e  
prepared, and forms of agreements c o v e r i n g  the use of reclamation and 
Indian lands for center sites were developed. The office prepared or 
reviewed the various regional office instructions, procedures, and forms 
that  were issued, and prepared numerous contracts, lease agreements and 
other legal instruments that were found t o  be needed. 
6 
During m o s t  of his tenure the San Francisco regional attorney had a 
small s t a f f  of attorneys t o  a s s i s t  him. 
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Beginning i n  the summer of 1942, w i t h  the t r ans fe r  of responsi- 
b i l i t y  for evacuee property assistance from the Western Defense Command 
t o  WRA, legal  work i n  connection with evacuee property matters assumed 
increasingly larger proportions. The regional attorney in San Fran- 
cisco worked closely with the evacuee property division i n  establish- 
i n g  tentative policies and procedures, handled much of the corres- 
pondence with evacuees, t h e i r  creditors or debtors, insurance com- 
panies, substitute operators and prospective purchasers,  and treated 
numerous legal  p r o b l e m s ,  including questions of authority under powers 
of attorney, interpretation of lease agreements, attachment of evacuee 
funds, applicabili ty of Treasury regulations, and the d r a f t i n g  of b i l l s  
of sale  and other legal instruments, Negotiations w i t h  the California 
State Bar for  the es t ab l i shmen t  of an attorney refer ra l  system (dis- 
cussed l a t e r  in t h i s  report) were begun during t h i s  period. 
Prior t o  the abolition of the Pacific C o a s t  region 4 of the 6 
project attorney positions within the region had been f i l l ed ,  The 
regional attorney was responsible for  supervising the work of these 
project attorneys and f o r  answering the many questions tha t  they raised, 
Late i n  the summer of 1942 the two other regional attorney posi- 
tions were filled. The ac t iv i t i e s  of the central  and southern regions 
revolved primarily about the e s t a b l i s h m e n t ,  staffing and i n i t i a l  opera- 
t ion of the 2 centers that  were within each region. The regional attor- 
neys worked closely w i t h  the regional directors on a l l  operational 
problems and participated in negotiations with various State  and local 
agencies. After the movement of the evacuees t o  the centers in these 
regions, the respective regional attorneys divided the i r  time between 
the centers pending appointment of project attorneys. The organization 
and s taff ing of the center lega l  offices, e s t ab l i shen t  of l ia i son  
with local  public: agencies, the organization of the evacuee business 
enterprises, the formation of evacuee community government within the 
centers under WRA  policies, and the handling of individual problems of 
evacuees occupied most of the i r  time. 
The Work of the San Francisco Office 
Assistance to  Evacuee P r o p e r t y  Division 
The San Francisco office was established a t  a t i m e  (December 1942) 
when WRA policies governing evacuee property assistance were crystaii iz- 
ing, One of the f irst  major tasks undertaken i n  collaboration with the 
Evacuee Property Division was the drafting of policy statements ,  to- 
gether with detailed procedures and forms, t o  govern WRA assistance t o  
evacuees i n  p r o p e r t y  managanent assistance and WRA storage and trans- 
portation of the i r  personal effects,  Assistance i n  drafting operational 
instructions and various modifications i n  the procedures and forms 
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continued throughout the program. After the evacuee property organiza- 
t ion was s e t  up, with offices in principal West Coast c i t i e s  and i n  all 
centers, a considerable volume of work developed from f i e l d  referrals  of 
legal  questions t o  the Evacuee Property Division, and in consultation  
work with the division on complex managanent cases. An attorney from 
the San Francisco off ice  also made a number of t r i p s  to the property 
offices up and d o w n  the coast t o  discuss general legal aspects of the 
various problems being handled and t o  a s s i s t  i n  closing particular 
troublesome cases. 
Assistance t o  Project Attorneys 
Most of the legal  questions confronting the project attorneys i n  
assis t ing evacuees w i t h  the i r  property m a t t e r s  involved interpretation 
and application of the l a w  of the West Coast, and many of them required 
contact or negotiation withpublic of f ic ia l s  or attorneys in those 
States. The project attorneys were directed t o  communicate directly 
with the San Francisco office concernirig these problems, and the San 
Francisco office w a s  primarily responsible for supplying the necessary 
information or taking the appropriate action, The volume of these re- 
fe r ra l s  was very large, and constituted the largest  single segment of 
the off ice ' s  workload. Where the problems raised were likely t o  be of 
general interest t o  all project attorneys, the San Francisco office 
prepared memoranda or opinions for general distribution throughout the 
ent i re  lega l  organization. Supplementing this service, the attorney 
i n  charge of the San Francisco office made several f i e l d  t r i p s  t o  the 
various relocation centers fo r  the purpose of observing the evacuee 
property aspects of the project attorneys' work, making suggestions 
t o  improve coordination and efficiency, clarifying legal  and policy 
issues, and assisting i n  the handling of more d i f f i cu l t  individual 
cases. 
The Attorney Referral System 
A s  the  volume of property and personal problerms of evacuees i n  the 
centers mounted it became increasingly apparent tha t  many matters, 
particularly those involving s u i t s  by or against evacuees, w o u l d  re- 
quire the services of lawyers in private practice, Most of the eva- 
cuees had had no preevacuation contact with lawyers. Those who did 
could not be sure the i r  former counsel would agree t o  represent them. 
To al leviate  this s i tuat ion the Ssn Francisco office, i n  collaboration 
with the Sta te  B a r  of California, devised an attorney referral  system, 
California attorneys who had previously expressed a desire t o  en- 
gage in State  bar w a r  work ac t iv i t i e s  were polled t o  deternine how many 
would agree t o  handle evacuee business, Some 800 favorable responses 
w e r e  received. The names of these attorneys were  placed on referral 
lists classif ied on the  basis of loca l i ty  and. specialty, i f  any.  
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Whenever an evacuee wished t o  make use of the re fer ra l  system, the 
project attorney notified the  San Francisco office, designating the 
loca l i ty  in  which the lega l  services were necessary and the f i e l d  of 
l a w  involved, The San Francisco office then furnished the project 
attorney  with the names, in alphabetical sequence, of three attorneys 
in the designated loca l i ty  and legal  specialty. From these the eva- 
cuee made h i s  selection, Further information concerning the qualifica- 
of the attorneys involved w a s  furnished on request. Upon selec- 
t ion of an attorney the evacuee executed a "cl ient ' s  s t a t emen t , "  desig- 
nating the  selected attorney, s ta t ing the nature of the services re- 
quired, and requesting the attorney t o  keep the Authority advised a s  
t o  progress. T h i s  request relieved the attorney from any obligation 
to keep the affairs  of his cl ient  confidential so fa ras the Authority 
was concerned, and was designed t o  provide a basis  for l ia ison between 
the attorney selected and the appropriate WRA f i e l d  attorney who w a s  
assisting the evacuee, as w e l l  as  for  determining the adequacy of the 
legal  services being rendered. 
The c l ien t ' s  statement was sent t o  the attorney  and upon accept- 
ance established the lawyer-client relationship. The San Francisco 
office then placed t h e  name of the selected attorney a t  the end of the 
particular r e fe r ra l  list, to insure complete rotation, When the desig- 
nated attorney declined t o  represent the evacuee or h i s  services were 
terminated, the next three names in sequence on the list were submitted 
t o  the evacuee. The San Francisco office was authorized t o  remove indi- 
vidual attorneys from the lists for good cause, 
Each attorney on the r e fe r ra l  lists agreed to represent evacuees 
on the basis of a schedule of fees  covering common types of legal ser- 
vices rendered-foreclosures, probate, divorces, leases, collections, 
contracts, consultation and preparation, trial work, and appellate 
work, The Fee schedules were scaled on the basis of county popula- 
tion, and were uniformly lower than the average f ees  charged for  simi- 
lar work in the locality.  Each evacuee was apprised of the appropri- 
a t e  fee schedule before he executed the c l ien t ' s  statement, 
The attorney r e fe r ra l  system was  extensively used by California 
evacuees, and proved  to be g e n e r a l l y  effective.  Attempts by the San 
Francisco offlce to work out similar arrangements in Arizona, Oregon, 
and Washington were, h o w e v e r ,  unsuccessful. Where the services of a 
lawyer i n  any State  other than California was needed and the evacuee 
wished assistance in obtaining those services, the project attorney 
submitted to him for selection names of attorneys taken fromstandard 
law lists or from names recommended by the appropriate bar association. 
Where an evacuee was unable to pay fo r the services of an attorney and 
it appeared tha t  the fees could not be collected out of the probable 
proceeds o f  the case, the project attorney on request referred the 
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matter t o  the lega l  aid society i n  or nearest t o  the loca l i ty  i n  which 
the services were required. 
Alien Land Laws 
The postevacuation period saw a surge of ac t iv i ty  by California 
and Washington l a w  enforcement officers i n  the investigation of possible 
violations of the alien land laws of those States by evacuees and in the 
ins t i tu t ion  of escheat proceedings against them. When it appeared that 
some evacuee defendants were doing nothing because of lack of actual 
notice, the San Francisco office arranged with the respective State  
attorneys general fo r  delivery to it of copies of the summons and com- 
p la in t  in each case filed. The office then located the defendants and 
made cer tain that  they were advised of the ins t i tu t ion  of escheat pro- 
ceedings and of the avai labi l i ty  of attorneys through the attorney re- 
f e r r a l  lists. Some50  escheat actions are now pending in California 
and investigations, aided by a State appropriation of $200,000, are 
still in progress, 
The office was assigned the task of preliminary research into the 
West Coast alien land l a w s  that  resulted i n  a ser ies  of Sol ici tor 's  
opinions discussing them. With the f i l i n g  of escheat actions numerous 
questions on technical aspects of the l a w s  and possible col la teral  de- 
fenses, raised by the project attorneys, were the subject of additional 
formal opinions issued by the San Francisco office. 
Other  Problems 
Legal research a t  the request of project attorneys ranged the 
whole f i e l d  of property law, with emphaais on the law of foreclosures, 
community property, probate, taxation, and tenancy. Matters referred 
t o  the San Francisco office by the project attorneys or  the Evacuee 
Property Division for negotiation or expedition were numerous, Many 
 involved participation i n  extended negotiations for  the settlement of
controversies aris ing i n  the course of private management of evacuee 
property. There were also negotiations w i t h   S t a t e  attorneys 
general on a l ien  land law problems, taxation of personalty, and various 
other problems of State  law interpretation; with agencies liquidating 
the Japanese-controlled banks on the West Coast, t o  simplify proce- 
dures for the f i l i n g  of claims by evacuee depositors; with the appro- 
pr ia te  Federal. agencies on the requisitioning of evacuee farm machinery; 
with the Farm Security Administration on the interpretation of i ts  
loan agreements w i t h  substitute operatars of evacuee farms; w i t h  the 
Federal Reserve Bank and the regional Alien Property Custodian's office 
with respect to property and funds of ind iv idual  evacuees; with t i t l e  
insurance companies t o  obtain a relaxation i n  restrictions upon t i t l e  
insurance upon r e a l  property o f fe red  f o r  sale  by evacuees; and with 
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f i r e  and casualty insurance companies t o  persuade them t o  reverse their  
general policy, adopted ear ly in the war,  of refusing insurance t o  
evacuees. 
Special Assignments 
In addition t o  research in to  the alien land laws, the San Fran- 
cisco office a t  the Sol ici tor ls  request made studies of a number of 
legal  problems, including the effect  of leases fo r  the "duration" of 
the w a r  and the constitutionality of State laws banning aliens ineli-  
gible for  naturalization from  commercial fishing. The attorney i n  
charge of the office was responsible for  keeping the Solicitor in- 
formed of the inst i tut ion and progress of all West Coast l i t i ga t ion  in- 
volving evacuees, particularly land escheat actions and su i t s  involving 
violation of m i l i t a r y  orders or Selective Service regulations. He 
handled negotiations which resulted i n  the dismissal of habeas corpus 
actionsbrought t o  test the val idi ty  of the special disciplinary regu- 
la t ions a t  the Tule Lake center that  were designed t o  prohibit overt 
pro-Japanese activit ies.  He was appointed WRA representative i n  the 
hearings before the board of appeals for  leave clearance which met a t  
Tule Lake, He w a s  active in recruiting attorneys fo r  WRA positions, 
and a member of his s ta f f  was on several occasions detailed t o  a re- 
location center to  serve as  or work with the project attorney. 
With the l i f t i n g  of the exclusian orders and the establishment 
of three West Coast area offices and numerous d i s t r i c t  offices to  
a s s i s t  returning evacuees, the San Francisco office was responsible 
for  servicing those off ices  u n t i l  the appointment of area attornetys at 
Los Angeles and Seattle i n  the summer of 1945. Thereafter the office 
serviced only the San Francisco area. The types of problems arising 
and the servlces rendered are  covered i n  the l a t e r  discussion of the 
work of the area attorneys. 
The Work of the Project Attorneys 
The work of the project attorney included three types of services, 
H e  was responsible of course for a l l  legal  advice and assistance t o  the 
project director and the center staff, Secondly, he rendered a l l  neces- 
sary legal  services t o  the various evacuee organizations, including 
the community council, the judicial  c o m m i s s i o n ,  and various general or 
special committees, and the private organisations, such as the business 
enterprises, the recreational associations, and special trusts s e t  up 
fo r  the operation of war industries i n  several centers by outside con- 
tractors. Thirdly, he was available t o  all evacuees f o r  assistance i n  
the i r  individual lega l  problems. Broadly speaking, his was the com- 
bined ro le  of Government lawyer, c i ty  attorney, and private attorney 
t o  an evacuee population of from 5,000 t o  17,000 persons. 
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Staff Services 
The first major segment of the project attorney's work-that of 
advice and assistance t o  the center adminsitrative off icials  on all 
legal  aspects of center administration-included interpretation of 
Federal f i s c a l  aws and other relevant Federal statutes; interpreta- 
t ion and implementation of WRA regulations; review of procurement and 
other contracts; preparation of use permits, leases, and other legal  
instruments in connection w i t h  temporary p r i v a t e  use of center lands; 
advice t o  the welfare division on such matters as divorce, adoption, 
guardianship, and child support; negotiations and l ia ison with State 
and l o c a l  of f ic ia ls  on the handling of crimes committed by evacuees, 
insti tutienalization of the insane, probate of estates  of decedents 
without known heirs, and the furnishing of other types of State and 
local governmental services. 7 The  project attorney necessarily worked 
closely  with the project director and the  internal security  s t a f f  on all 
law and order problems, drafting supplemental procedures  governing dis- 
ciplinary action taken by the project director,  advising  on the nature 
of charges t o  be f i l e d  and the sufficiency of the e v i d e n c e ,  and parti- 
cipating in the conduct of disciplinary hearings. A s  a key member 
of the center s taff ,  the  project attorney participated in staff confer- 
ences on all the various and complex administrative matters tha t  arose 
from time t o  time and assisted the project director and s ta f f  members 
in resolving the diff icul t ies ,  as in the  case of adjustment of evacuee 
complaints and protests against WRA policies, Juvenile delinquency 
problems, negotiations with host i le  State or local  o f f i c i a l s ,  and revi- 
sions in  procedures required by changes i n  over-all policy. 
In addition, various types of purely administrative functions were 
often assigned to  the project attorney. While generally these assign- 
ments were only temporary expedients, as i n  the handling of all evacuee 
property assistance pr ior  t o  establishment of center evacuee property 
offices, occasionally they became permanent. A t  a few centers, f o r  
example, all Selective Service m a t t e r s  affecting evacuees were handled 
i n  the project attorney's o f f i e  as a service t o  the respective local  
Selective Service boards. Under WRA screening procedures, a leave 
clearance hearing board, consisting of key members of the staff, was 
established a t  each center for  the purpose of conducting hearings and 
further investigations requested by the Director  in s o - c a l l e d  doubtful 
cases. The p r o j e c t  attorney served on t h i s  board, generally as chairman. 
7 
See also the  discussion of f i e l d  operations problems considered by 
the Washington office. 
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There were a large number of hearings, and much of the project  a t tor-  
neys' time in 1943 and 1944 was devoted t o  t h i s  work. 
 
C o m m u n i t y  Government 
Upon adoption of the WRA policy f o r  delegation of cer ta in  govern- 
mental functions t o  the evacuees, 9 the  project  attorneys played an 
important r o l e  in ass is t ing the evacuee organization commissions t o  d r a f t  
char ters  and formulate procedures t o  govern the  conduct of referenda 
and elections,  After adoption of the charters and elect ion of members 
of the community councils, the project  attorneys part icipated a t  the 
request of the councils in the draft ing of proposed regulations, i n  
the preparation of procedures t o  govern disciplinary hearings by the  
judic ia l  commissions, and in the more general. task of acquainting the 
commissions w i t h  the nature of t he i r  judic ia l  function and the proper 
conduct of hearings. The project  attorney often part icipated as  
observer or prosecutor in these hearings, and was consulted by the  
project  d i rector ,  on his review of the commission's findings, with 
respect  t o  t he  propriety of sentences imposed, a 
Private Enterprises 
Although the d r a f t  organization papers f o r  the evacuee-operated 
cooperative enterprises were prepared in the Washington office,  the 
project  attorneys were primarily responsible for  a l l  initial assistance 
t o  the  enterpr ises  i n  adapting the organization documents t o  l oca l  
needs, completing organization, draft ing forms and procedures t o  govern 
membership meetings, election of off icers ,  and the l i k e ,  and obtaining 
l icenses  t o  do business and otherwise complying with Sta te  and Federal 
regulatory and tax laws, Thereafter t he  project  attorneys were con- 
sul ted on numerous management and operational problems, and ass is ted 
in negotiations with t ax  author i t ies  and regulatory agencies on various 
matters. The attorneys were responsible fo r  seeing t h a t  a l l  necessary 
formal l e g a l  steps were taken i n  the dissolution of the enterpr ises  
upon center closure and i n  the  t rans fe r  of asse t s  t o  l iqu ida t ing  t rus tees  
f o r  f i n a l  distr ibution.  
A t  a number  of the centers the business enterpr ises  were unwilling 
t o  conduct and finance evacuee recreat ional  a c t i v i t i e s ,  and the project  
attorneys helped arganize evacuee-controlled t r u s t s  f o r  this purpose, 
A Federal c red i t  union was organized a t  one center, and several co- 
operative associations of WRA personnel were formed t o  provide recrea- 
t i ona l  f a c i l i t i e s .  The operation of camoflage  ne t  garnishing projects 
early in the program a t  several  centers involved the use of evacuee 
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labor by the Army contractor, and required ra ther  complex arrangements 
f o r  the  assignment of wages received above the standard WRA wage scale  
t o  evacuee t rus tees  f o r  equitable dis t r ibut ion among a l l  evacuees em- 
ployed in any capacity i n  center operations. 
Assistance to Evacuees 
By f a r  the  greates t  volume of work i n  the project  attorneys'
of f ices  lay i n  assistance   to evacuees on t h e i r  personal problems, The 
general range of these problems has already been indicated i n  the  dis- 
cussions of l ega l  research on evacuee problems a t  the Washington level ,  
and of alien land law and other problems dea l t  w i t h  by the  San Fran- 
cisco office. Much of the routine work consisted of advice and corres- 
pondence on insurance matters and i n  t h e  preparation of income tax  re- 
turns, repor ts  of assets  and applications f o r  specia l  l icenses under 
foreign funds control  regulations, claims of evacuee depositors against 
Japanese-controlled banks being l iquidated by the Government, applica- 
t ions  by c i t i zens  for  the return of property surrendered under a l i en  
enemy control  proclamations, and various types of l ega l  instruments, 
including powers of attorney, leases, b i l l s  of sale, deeds, mortgages, 
w i l l s ,  af f idavi ts ,  and depositions. Domestic re la t ions  problems of 
the  evacuees were handled in collaboration with the center welfare di- 
vision,  and., where court action was required, the project  at torney made 
the necessary arrangements fo r  private l ega l  representation, court 
appearances, and depositions. Deaths a t  the centers ra i sed  numerous 
probate problems involvinp; r e f e r r a l s  t o  pr ivate  attorneys, preparation 
of documents f o r  t ransfer  of decedents' assets  without probate, and 
negotiating with public administrators i n  the case af evacuees dying 
without known heirs. 
I n  problems involving property managanent or disposition, the  
center evacuee property o f f ice r  was primarily responsible f o r  assistance 
t o  the evacuees, Requests for storage and transportat ion of property , 
or assistance i n  se l l ing,  leasing, o r  managing property, which con- 
s t i t u t e d  the bulk of h i s  work, generally presentedno l ega l  problems. 
However, there  were many types of cases t ha t  did involve l ega l  issues,  
and the establishment of close working relat ionships between the  
property o f f ice r  and the project  attorney was essential . This w a s  
accomplished through frequent conferences on current problems, in ter-  
change of copies of outgoing: correspondence, and agreement on a practi- 
c a l  d ivis ion of labor. 
One of the  most d i f f i c u l t  and time consuming problems presented 
t o  the project  attorneys and the evacuee property o f f ice rs  arose out 
of the  hurried and loose arrangements made by the evacuees fo r  the 
custody o r  management of t h e i r  West Coast property, Personal property 
unaccountably disappeared; managers f a i l e d  t o  account, or mulcted the  
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o w n e r s  in various ways; tenants f a i l ed  t o  pay rent ,  converted property 
t o  t h e i r  own use, and committed waste. Much correspondence w i t h  t h e  
legal  off ice  i n  San Francisco and w i t h  West Coast property offices was 
required, and occasionally d i rec t  negotiations were undertaken, with 
varying degrees of success. W h i l e  in general the  evacuees  were reluc- 
t a n t  t o  i n s t i t u t e  l ega l  action, there were a number of s u i t s  brought, 
involving substant ia l  income properties. In these cases, a s  in cases 
involving divorces, probate, collections,  escheat under alien land 
laws, and claims against  evacuees, the  project  at torneys  ass i s ted  the 
evacuees i n  obtaining pr ivate  counsel and thereaf ter  often acted i n  a 
l i a i son  capacity between the  evacuees and t h e i r  attorneys. 
The sheer volume of l ega l  work f o r  evacuees was generally so 
great  t h a t  the project  attorney could not have handled i t  alone, and 
at almost a l l  centers there was  a staff of evacuee ass i s tan t s  i n  the 
project  at torney's  office. Most of these ass i s tan t s  were  themselves 
lawyers or  young men whose law s tudies had been interrupted by the 
evacuation. A s  the  relocation program accelerated, m a n y  of these 
persons l e f t  the  centers, and were replaced by evacuees with insurance, 
taxation, or extensive business experience, who with t ra ining and 
supervision were able  t o  carry  much of the routine  work load. 
The Work of the Area Attorneys 
The decision t o  es tabl ish  area attorney positions i n  the area 
of f ices  a t  Los Angeles and Seat t le  stemmed from the large number of 
evacuees returning t o  the West Coast, the  problems of housing, dis- 
crimination, and relocation ad jus tmen t  that  were arising,  and the 
inadequacy of temporary d e t a i l s  of attorneys from the San Francisco 
of f ice  to service  the Pacific northwest and southern California  areas. 
P r a c t i c a l l y  all of the  work of the  area attorneys involved legal. 
assistance, d i r ec t l y  or i n d i r e c t l y ,  i n  solving the i n i t i a l  adjustment 
problems of the  r e t u r n i n g  evacuees. 
The severe housing shortage i n  pr incipal  c i t i e s  on the  West Coast 
created a d i f f i c u l t  problem f o r  the  many evacuees who no longer had 
homes  t o  which t o  return,  and much of WRA a c t i v i t y  in  i t s  West Coast 
areas consisted of locating private  housing. To supplenent t h i s  WRA 
ass i s ted  cooperating organizations i n  the establishment of hostels, 
and the  area attorneys par t ic ipated i n  the draft ing of agreements f o r  
the loan of WRA equipment and i n  obtaining waivers of s t r i c t  compli- 
ance with c i t y  zoning regulations. When it became apparent t ha t  addi- 
t ional  provision needed t o  be made, WRA acquired Anny and other in- 
s t a l l a t i ons  t h a t  could be used f o r  temporary housing, and the  Federal 
Public Housing Administration agreed t o  make necessary building 
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a l te ra t ions  and operate the projects as  agent  f o r  WRA. The area a t tor-  
neys collaborated in renegotiation of leases where the  ins ta l l a t ions  
wereon pr ivate ly  owned land, working out the d e t a i l s  of FPHA operation, 
negotiating with c i t y  author i t ies  f o r  necessary services, and completing 
arrangements under which FPHA  assumed responsibi l i ty  fo r  operation of 
several.  t r a i l e r  c a m p s  a f t e r WRA liquidation. 
Many evacuees, however, had homes t o  which t o  return. The area 
attorneys obtained c la r i f i ca t ion  of OPA pol ic ies  and procedures 
g o v e r n i n g  evict ion of tenants, and ass is ted the project  attorneys i n  
sa t i s fac tory  settlement of numerous evict ion cases. Considerable 
advice was given evacuees seeking t o  lease  o r  purchase r e a l  property, 
par t icular ly  w i t h  respect  t o  appl icabi l i ty  of a l i e n  land laws, inter-  
pretat ion and enforceabil i ty  of r e s t r i c t i ve  covenants, and t i t l e  in- 
surance requirements, Negotiations fo r  reoccupancy or removal of 
evacuee-owned buildings on leased land were undertaken. A number of 
cases involving evacuee defaults  on instalment purcnases of r e a l  
property were s e t t l e d  on terms favorable t o  t he  evacuees.    Discrimination 
While on the whole evacuees returning t o  the West Coast met w i t h  a 
favorable reception, there were isola ted instances of intimidation and 
discrimination. The wave of shootings a t  evacuee dwellings i n  Cali- 
fornia  r u r a l  areas i n  the spring of 1945 received nation-wide publicity. 
, Other  forms of discrimination, i so la ted  i n  character, were a lso  i n  
evidence, Thus, u n t i l  confronted with a mandamus action, one Sta te  
agency refused t o  issue sa les  t ax  permits t o  evacuees without special. 
Army and Navy clearance. Former r e a l  e s t a t e  and insurance brokers 
found obstacles i n  obtaining renewal of t he i r  licenses. Several c i t i e s  
refused to  issue business l icenses to t h e  al iens,  I n  other occupations 
i t  was d i f f i c u l t  or impossible fo r  evacuees t o  obtain licenses. There 
were instances where employers or unions objected t o  rehiring evacuees. 
Even more serious were active or threatened boycottsagainst evacuee 
farmers and businessmen. The area attorneys were act ive  in negotia- 
t ions  with licensing author i t ies ,  employers, and unions t o  a l l ev ia te  
these conditions, and met with p a r t i a l  success. Acts of discrimina- 
t ion  involving possible violat ion of Federal or S ta te  law were taken 
up with the  appropriate Federal or Sta te  o f f ic ia l s ,  and evacuees with 
possible c i v i l  causes of action ar is ing out of discriminatory measures 
were advised of t h e i r  igh t s  and given assistance-where requested i n  
re ta ining pr ivate  attorneys. 
Miscellaneous 
By and large most of the t i m e  of the area attorneys w a s  spent in 
handling i n d i v i d u a l  problems of evacuees similar t o  those formerly 
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handled by the project attorneys. Assistance i n  application fo r  
Treasury Department licenses, return of contraband, cancellation or  
reinstatement of insurance policies, preparation of eviction notices, 
the f i l i ng  of claims against the liquidators of Japanese-controlled 
banks, and similar matters bulked large in office routine, Advice 
was given i n  cases involving violation of leases or management con- 
t racts ,  sale or purchase of property, settlement of t o r t  claims, and 
thef t  of privately stored personal property. Area attorneys also made 
numerous t r i p s  to d i s t r i c t  relocation offices t o  a s s i s t  i n  handling 
relocation adjustment problems and t o  explain t o  WRA personnel OPA and 
other Federal regulations, the alien land laws, and the legal  aspects 
of other types of factual  si tuations that  were constantly confronting 
those offices, 
Most of the personal problems of evacuees tha t  came to  the area 
attorneys' at tention were of such a nature tha t  private attorneys 
would not be interested in handling them. In matters involving con- 
siderable sums of money, possible l i t igat ion,  o r  complex legal  issues, 
however, the area attorneys assisted the evacuees i n  obtaining local  
legal  representation. The area attarneys were instructed t o  take such 
s teps  as might be necessary t o  insure the avai labi l i ty  of adequate 
legal services fo r  the evacuees a f t e r  WRA l iquidation ,  The aid of 
loca l  cooperating committees, representatives of the American Civil 
Liberties Union, and other civic organizations and leaders was 
sol ic i ted to this end, 
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